The Modoc Indian War by Torgerson, Kenneth L.
THE MODOC INDIAN WAR 
by 
Kenneth L. Torgerson 
A Thesis 
Presented to the Department of 
History and the Graduate Division of the 
University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 




(For the CollDDittee) 
~ ~\ 

















Table of Contents 
The Causes . ............................................. . 
Prelude to Disaster • •••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••• 
The Fighting ............................................ . 
The Assassination • •••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Capture ..••••.•.•••..........•.••••..•.•.....••••...•••. 
The Trial • •••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Aftermath and Conclusions ............................... 
Epilogue 
Bibliography 












Map of the Lava Beds Region ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Reconaissance of the Lava Beds • ••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 
" ft ft " " . ......................... 
Photo of the Lava Beds • ••••••••••••••• 0 • ' ••••••••••••••• 
ft II " II " • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••• 
" II II If II .................................. 
II II ft ft It 
•••••••••••••o•••••••••••••••••••• 
" II " ft " • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 • 
" ft " " " . ............................... ., . 



















Mark Twain's "Gilded Age" was a fabulous era. The "Gospel of 
Wealth" oreated economic titans such as Andrew Carnegie, John Rockefeller, 
E. H. Harriman, Jim Fiske, and J.P. Morgan; it fostered the success 
stories of Horatio Alger; it built and sustained great slums. 
Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Lewis Henry Morgan, Bob Ingersoll, Henry 
and Brooks Adams, E. L. Godkin, and others wielded a powerful intellectual 
in.fluence. 
Cowboys, cavalry, and Indians added a dubious glamour to the age; 
Custer made his Last Stand; Cochise tried to keep peace in the Southwest 
and Geronimo broke it; Ulysses S. Grant was President of the United 
States in 1872 and 1873 when a small band of Indians in Southeastern 
Oregon added a brief chapter of their own to the "Gilded Age." 
This is the story of Captain Jack and the Modoc Indian War. 
ri 
' .I\. ~ ... 
CHAPTER I THE CAUSES 
On November 26, 1872, a band of Indians numbering some 50 
warriors and 150 women and children left their reservation in Southeast 
Oregon, made their way forty miles South to the banks of Lost River, 
and waited for the United States Army or the Department of the Interior 
to take action. At dawn November 29, thirty-five soldiers and eight 
civilians arrived at the camp to return the Indians, peacefully if 
possible, forcibly if necessary. Making every assurance that there would 
be ample provision and protection should the Indians return to the reserve, 
a young Cavalry Lieutenant, John A. Boutelle advanced toward one of the 
Indians named Scarface Charley. "Hand me the gun!," he ordered. Scarface 
refused, and in the mounting tension two pistol shots sounded almost 
simultaneously, and another Indian War had begun. 1 
Twenty years of attempting to avert this war disappeared with those 
shots, and before the Army could win the war, the cost in men and money 
mounted incredibly out of proportion. For over four months, 1000 
American troops, well-trained and equipped tried to capture the 
lCyrus F. Brady, Northwest Fights and Fighters. (New York, 1913) 
266-267. 
Indians, but they failed miserably. 
The Indian tribe were Modocs--a branch of the larger and more powerful 
Klamath lndians--who ranged in a semi-nomadic existence over the rolling, brown 
hills and fertile plains of the Klamath Basin in Southeast Oregon and 
Northeast California. Chief of the Modocs was Captain Jack, a relatively 
tall, broad, moon-faced Indian. Second-in-command was Schonchin John, 
who exercised occasionally rigid control over subordinates with such 
fascinating names as Shacknasty Jim, Black Jim, Hooker Jim, Boston 
Charley, Long-faced Jim, and One-eyed Dave. Most of the actual fight-
ing was in the lava beds, a grotesque and nearly inaccessible mass of 
lava rock in Northeast California near the present town of Tulelake. 
Speaking of the lava beds, Don Fisher, late Superintendent of the Lava 
Beds National Monument, and authority on the Modoc War jokingly suggested 
that had not the food, water, and ammunition of the Modocs given out, 
"they might still be there." 
Fisher also suggested that the reasons behind this conflict can be 
compared to patterns of other Indian Wars in American history. Prejudice, 
misunderstanding, and fear were responsible for the deaths in the winter 
months of 1872-1873, and these reasons have certainly played major roles 
in creating, say, the Nez Perce War, the Apache difficulties, and the 
stubborn resistance of the Sioux and other Plains Indians. Thus, the 
Modoc War was not unusual. 
Most writers concerned with the Modoc Warf contend the difficulties 
can be traced to the Ben Wright Indian Massacre in late 1852. For 
several years prior to this Massacre, emigrants moving over the 
2-rhere are not many. 
Applegate Trail into Southern Oregon, had been in conflict with the Modoc 
and Pit River Indians, culminating in the killing of 75 white emigrants 
in the summer of 1852 on the shores of Tule Lake in Northeast California. 3 
Although there was doubt about which tribe committed the act, a company 
of volunteers mustered "for the protection of other emigrants" arrived 
on the scene two days later to bury the dead and chastise the Indians. 
Under the command of Ben Wright, the volunteers, some 35 strong, could 
not engage the Modocs in "fair battle," and resorted to trickery. Terms 
for a combination peace conference and feast were then proposed to the 
Modocs. Although naturally cautious, many of the Modocs were unable 
to resist the prospect of a feast and gathered around Wright's campfire. 
Wright first attempted to poison the Modoc food with strychnine, but 
the Indians waited impatiently for the Whites to begin eating. Realiz-
ing poison would not work, Wright approached the Modoc Chief, Schonchin, 
pulled his revolver, and shot him in the chest. Wright's men followed 
his example and killed 41 of 46 unarmed Modocs.4 
Brandishing the scalps of the Modocs, Wright and his men rode back 
to Yreka, California, where. t-hey were met with extended congratulations 
~ 
for their "peacemadng."~ .,,, 
A. B. Meacham, late Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Oregon, and 
a Special Commissioner to the Modocs during the war, asserts that this 
3A. B. Meacham, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1873. (Washington, 
D.C., 1874) 78. 
4A. B. Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath. <Boston, 1875) 298. 
5Jeff A. Riddle, The Indian History of the Modoc War. CNP, 1914) 30. 
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act of treachery has always been remembered by the Modoc people and had 
much to do in perpetuating the bitter feelings that have since existed.6 
Meacham's opinion must be considered as fairly reliable because he was 
earnestly involved in the fighting and strategy, preceding and during the 
Modoc War. 
Doris Palmer Payne, an avid collector of Modoc artifacts, and 
author of Captain ~' Mqdoc Renegade, agrees with Meacham: "Over 
and over again, the story of that horror-filled night was told until 
everyone knew the smallest detail by heart ••• until the survivors had it 
etched deeply in their minds."7 
However, classifying the Wright episode as the major cause of the 
Modoc War is incorrect on two counts. First, many of the important 
Modocs who fought in 1872-73 were at the time of the massacre extremely 
young or not yet born which would refute the theory that memories of the 
" ••• Massacre" were deeply engraved on the Modoc mind. Second, there 
were other, more direct reasons for the outbreak of fighting in 1872. 
Effects of the Wright Massacre no doubt contributed to Modoc dissatis-
faction with governmental practices. Therefore. it should be placed in 
context as a contributing factor. 
Conflicting accounts obscure the activities of Captain Jack's band 
from 1853 to 1864. The obvious inference is that the Modocs during 
this period were peaceful, if not inclined to indolence. Lawyer Elisha 
Steele of Yreka, a close friend of all the tribes in the area claims 
6 Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath., 298. 
7Doris Palmer Payne, Captain Jack, Modoc Renegade. <Portland, Ore., 
1938) 16. 
that Captain Jack never took a glass of liquor and often whipped his men 
for doing so.8 Jeff Riddle, the son of the Indian heroine of the Modoc 
War, and a first-hand observer during the conflict, states that, "along 
about 1859 the Whites began to settle Captain Jack's country ••• They 
(the Modocs) welcomed the settlers. They got along fine; the settlers 
gave the Indians work, making juniper posts and rails, etc •••• The 
Indians never bothered the settlers and were not bothered in return."9 
But the Yreka Journal has a different version, contending that "Jack 
and his band, not restrained by authority of any kind ••• ranged up and· 
down among the ranchers, visiting houses in the absence of the men, 
ordering the women to cook their dinners, lounging on beds while the 
frightened women complied, and committing various similar outrages for 
/;ear.Ji before the war began, causing the settlers to send their families 
to the Rogue River for safety."10 Meacham, probably the most reliable 
authority, concurs with the Journal, reporting to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs that the Modocs were a constant source of annoyance to 
the settlers and would continue to be unless placed on an adequate reser-
vation. 
Apparently this eleven-year period was one of uncertainty, with 
Jack and his Modocs remaining docile during the winter months when food 
and shelter were scarce, and becoming rambunctious in the summer when 
the threat of starvation or freezing was not present. 
8Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath., 304. 
9Riddle, Indian History., 32. 
lOYreka Journal. (Yreka, California) File of issues for 1872 and 1873. 
Quoted from Payne, Captain Jack, Modoc Renegade. 
However, Captain Jack's annoyances, real or otherwise, were to stop 
October 14, 1864, at Council Grove near Fort Klamath where 710 Klamaths, 
339 Modocs, and 22 Snake Indians met with J. W. Huntington, then Super-
intendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon to cede their ancestral homes to 
the government and become "agency" Indians. Included in this vast cession 
was a large reserve beginning just north of present day Klamath Falls 
and encompassing the area bordered on the West by Klamath Lake, on the 
North by Fort Klamath, and on the East by a range of low mountains. 
For this grant, the treaty provided a total payment of $80,000 over a 
period of years and an additional $35,000 for the Indians to subsist on 
during the first year after their arrivai. 11 
Excerpts from the treaty that conditioned conduct during the years 
irmnediately prior to the war are important in reference to the Modoc 
War. Tracts of land ranging from 40 to 120 acres were assigned to 
Indian families and "are guaranteed the perpetual possession and use 
of the tracts thus granted and of the improvements which may be placed 
thereon; the exclusive right to taking fish in the streams and lakes, 
included in said reservation, and of gathering edible roots, seeds and 
berries within its limits is hereby secured to the Indians ••• 12 
"The several tribes ••• agree ••• to commit no depradations upon the 
persons or property of LUnited State~ citizens, and to refrain from 
11House Executive Documents, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. Ser 1708, vol. 1, 
Doc. 183, 1875. Report of the Committee on Public Lands. 
12otis Johnson, "The History of the Klamath Indian Reservation 1864-1900." 
(Unpublished Master's Thesis, Eugene, Ore., History Department, 
University of Oregon) 191-199. 
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carrying on any war upon the other tribes ••• "13 The treaty then forbids 
any fighting or depradations for the tribes on the reservation--the 
Klamaths and the Modocs. 
With these facts, the picture of the years 1864 to 1872 will come 
into necessary sharper focus, for these were the years that directly 
fostered the beginning of the Modoc War. 
Although the Modocs had come on the reservation in 1865 and remained 
there peacefully for a year, they left in 1866 because agency living 
was not comparable to their former life on the Lost River. For three 
years the Modocs remained off the reservation until in 1869 Indian 
Agent O. C. Knapp began to receive letters and complaints from settlers 
that their cattle and property were being molested by lndians--namely, 
the Modocs. Knapp, a military man used to having his orders carried 
out unquestionably,14 and A. B. Meacham, by then Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs for Oregon realized that the Modocs must be brought back 
or a war would result. 
Accordingly, Meacham and a peace commission met with the Modocs in 
November 1869, and persuaded them to return under the condition that the 
Modocs would be guaranteed protection from the more powerful Klamaths. 
The Modocs were placed on a beautiful site some twenty-five miles 
north of Linkville, on the shores of huge Klamath Lake, Captain Jack 
inunediately asked Agent Knapp for chopping axes, cross-cut saws, wedges 
and maul rings so timber could be felled, logs split, and cabins erected. 
Agent Knapp complied immediately, and shortly, the Modocs had split 
13jlli. 




900 pine rails. But snow began to fall and work halted for a few 
days until the snow melted. When the Modocs resumed work, several 
Klamaths arrived with wagons and teams, loaded part of the Modoc rails, 
and drove away into the timber. Captain Jack made no protest, but 
the Klamaths reappeared and began to load more rails, forcing Jack to 
appeal to Agent Knapp.15 
Knapp suggested the Modocs move five miles up the Williamson River, 
a little farther away from the Klamath settlements. The Modoc Chief 
agreed, and during the rest of the winter there were no incidents. 
In May 1870, the Modocs began again to make their rails, completing 
some 300 before the Klamaths again appeared and began to haul them off. 
Captain Jack restrained his men, and once more appealed to Knapp for 
justice. 
Knapp replied: "You black son of a bitch; .damn your heart; if 
you come and bother me any more with your complaints, I'll put you 
where no one will ever bother you again. Now get out of here and be 
damned quick about it?"16 
Jack quickly exclaimed, "Bogus Charley, tell this man I am not a 
dog. Tell him I am a man, if I am an Indian. Tell him that I and my 
men shall not be slaves for a race of people that is not any better than 
my people. If the agent does not protect me and my people, I shall not 
live here. If the government refuses to protect my people, who shall 
15.IJ.u..g,. I 345-346. 
16Riddle, Indian History., 37. 
I look to for protection?"l7 
Meacham lends credence to the above account, writing in June 1870, 
"it has been difficult work to keep the peace among them. The Klamaths 
are brave, but insolent and overbearing to the other Indians, especially 
to the Modocs. 11 18 At the new Williamson River location, Meacham 
continues, "the Klamaths ceaselessly annoyed them and Agent Knapp 
blundered by .Goving theJ!V. The mistake may be was made in ignorance, 
but I cannot blame them for leaving the reservation under such manage-
ment. "19 Embittered, the Modocs once again left in June 1870. 
With their return to Lost River the Modocs resumed where they had 
left off in 1864, visiting Yreka and adjacent mining towns. During the 
interval from summer 1870 to spring 1871 the Modocs were orderly and 
there were no incidents of any consequence. Also, the Indian Department 
and Chief Schonchin of a more peaceful branch of the Modocs made strong 
efforts to get Jack to return. A location at Yainax Station was 
proposed, "and in order that no reasonable excuse on the part of Captain 
Jack could be found on account of the Klamath Indians, and to remove 
every obstacle, the reservation was divided into distinct agencies; the 
western portion assigned to Klamath Indians, and the eastern portion to 
••• the Modocs."20 Agent Knapp was also removed from his post on 
September 15, 1870, by order of A. B. Meacham, and the new acting agent 
17lb.!d.. 
18Meacham, A,nnual Report 1870., 11. 
19 lJ2.!.g,. 
20Meacham, Wigwam and warpath., 349. 
was Meacham•s son John. 
Captain Jack, evidently, was seriously considering settling on the 
new location when another misunderstanding occurred that drove Jack and 
his band off the reservation for good. A child fell sick in the Modoc 
camp and Captain Jack employed an Indian doctor to cure the child, pay-
ing the fees in advance. The child died, and according to Modoc custom, 
Jack either killed the doctor personally, or ordered him killed. Under 
Modoc law, this would have closed the affair, but friends of the Indian 
insisted that Captain Jack be caught, tried, and punished under the 
white man's law. Apprehensive and confused, Jack hurried away from 
the a9ency, not to return until October 3. 1873. 21 
With the tension mounting, and war a definite possibility, Jesse 
. \, 
Applegate petitioned the Indian Department to grant the Modocs a small 
reservation 6 miles square, at the mouth of Lost River, their old home. 
Meacham agreed with Applegate's solution, and wrote to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs in Washington, "I would recormnend that they (the 
Modocs) be allowed a small reservation at the place indicated above, 
and also a pro rata division of the Klamath and Modoc treaty--funds for 
employes and annuities. Otherwise they will doubtless be a source of 
constant expense to the government, and great annoyance to the white 
settlements near them ••• it is not strange or unreasonable that great 
charity should be extended to these people ••• actual experience demonstrates 
the impractibility of 'consolidating' tribes of Indians ••• "22 Meacham 
21The day he was hanged. 
22Meacham, Annual Report 1871., 306. 
also requested that the government defer any military action until a 
further attempt for peace could be made. 
Meacham then instructed his son, John Meacham, Indian Agent, 
Klamath Agency to inform the Modocs, "that I will try to get a small 
reserve for them in their country; but it will require some time ••• and 
I desire them to go on any unoccupied lands on the Klamath Reservation."23 
Referring to Captain Jack's fear that he would be arrested for the 
death of the Indian doctor, Meacham continued, "Captain Jack and lJtiN 
men shall be free from arrest until I am ordered to investigate the 
affair ••• and if ever arrested, he shall have benefit of trial by his 
peers or white men, under civil law; on the condition fje returiJ to 
Klamath subject to authority of the Indian Department; L811J!I that if 
ordered to trial he will surrender himself and accomplices. "24 In a 
further attempt to conciliate the Modocs, Meacham wrote, ''Lill I succeed 
in getting a home for them on Lost River, they will be allowed their 
proportion of the Klamath and Modoc treaty funds with the privilege of 
the mill at Klamath Agency to make lumber, etc ••• if I fail in this 
they may elect to go into the Snake country beyond Camp warner."25 
With these instructions from his father, John Meacham, accompanied 
by Ivan Applegate, a pioneer settler of the area, and two other men left 
to confer with the Modocs in September 1871. 
The council began "in a wild desolate region of the country, many 
miles from the nearest white settlement, "26 and both sides, white and 




Indian, were heavily armed.· 
Captain Jack opened the council by explaining the grievances of his 
band, particularly against the Klamath Indians and the Indian Agent on 
the Reservation for failing to protect his people against Klamath 
depradations. He argued that the government had not kept its word in 
the 1864 treaty, and therefore the Modocs were released from its 
obligations and could come and go as they pleased; further that the 
crime he was charged with--killing the Indian doctor--was not a crime 
under Modoc law, and that he should not be held accountable for laws 
that were not his laws. Jack, turning to life on the reservation, 
then announced that the Modocs could not live in peace with the 
Klamaths and would try no more because they had already made two 
attempts. He concluded his speech, saying, "LI woul.!17' not object to 
the white man settling in /J,hii/ country J;nJi/ I would keep J;,.iJ people 
away from the settlements, and ••• prevent any trouble between white men 
and ./ii:ii' Indians. "27 
Meacham and his associates continued by offering the Modocs a home 
on any section of the Klamath Reservation with all the protection his 
tribe would need. The cormnissioners then· proposed that the Modocs stay 
where they were only until a full report could be submitted and the 
recommendation made that his people be granted a tract of land at the 
mouth of Lost River. 
Although Jack emphatically declined the offer to live permanently 
on the Klamath Reservation, he did agree to stay at Lost River until 
27.lltl,g,., 356. 
r 
such time as a decision could be made by the United States government. 
Of the situation at this point, General Ed. R. S. Canby, Commander. 
Military Division of the Pacific, wrote, "I am not surprised at the 
unwillingness of the Modocs to return to any point of the reservation 
where they would be exposed to the hostilities and annoyances they have 
heretofore experienced (and without adequate protection) from the 
Klamaths, but they have expressed a desire to be established upon Lost 
River, where they would be free from this trouble ••• in no other respect 
are the Modocs entitled to such consideration, and although many of 
the complaints against them have been found to be greatly exaggerated, 
they are, without being absolutely hostile, sufficiently troublesome to 
keep up a constant feeling of apprehension among the settlers. "28 
But the white settlers in the region took a different point-of-view. 
In a letter dated January 25, 1872 to A. B. Meacham and Canby: "We, the 
undersigned citizens of Lost and Link River, Klamath and Tule Lake country, 
after suffering years of annoyance from the presence of the Modoc Indians, 
••• ask now ••• shall a petty Indian chief with twenty desperadoes, and a 
squallid band of three hundred miserable savages any longer set at 
defiance the strong arm of the government, driving our citizens from 
their homes, threatening their lives and destroying their property. 
LWe recommen.sV their removal to their reservation in the winter season ••• "29 
Captain Jack and the Modocs had been growing restless with the 
28eouse Executive Documents, 43rd Cong. 1st Sess. Ser 1607, Preliminary 
Correspondence. Report from General Canby to Assistant Adjutant 
General, Military Division of the Pacific, Feb. 7, 1872, p. 6. 
29jlli.' 8-9. 
inactivity at their designated location and by the first two months of 
1872 were again annoying the settlers. The tension and the probability 
of hostilities prompted Meacham to reverse his former conciliatory 
attitude and he wrote to Canby on February 8, 1872: "had they behaved 
honestly and on their part maintained peaceable relations with the 
white settlers they might have remained /;here they wer,i/ undisturbed. 
Such has not been the case, and much as I regret the necessity of 
forcible arrest and return to the reservation, I can see no other way 
to secure peace and mete out justice. "30 
Meacham's change in attitude was prompted by a complaint from J.M. 
True, a settler on Lost River, who testified in a sworn statement, to 
Lieutenant W. L. Clarke January 3, 1872, to the Modoc unruliness, 
"Lail says certain Modocs came to his house, knocked down fences which 
enclosed his haystacks, and turned their ponies on to the hay, and also 
took hay away to their wigwams and also Lcarriei/ it away nightly for 
several nights. They also stole household utensils from Mr. Doten 
and halters from Mr. Whitney, both the aforesaid parties living near 
Mr. True. They also •• odemanded money from Mr. True. Captain Jack, chief 
of the Modocs threatened the lives of several white men, among them 
Messrs. Ball and Blair living near Lost River, Oregon. Mr. True also 
believes there is a likelihood of those threats being carried into 
effect. n3l 
With the potentially explosive situation unchanged, Meacham was 
30 lb.id.-, 12. 
31ll2.!g_., 7. 
l.4. 
replaced as Superintendent of Indian ~ffairs in March 1872, by Thomas 
B. Odeneal, a lawyer with limited knowledge of the Indian character. 32 
While this change was taking place, General Canby, on March 15, sent a 
force of thirty-three men to the Modoc region to remonstrate with 
Captain Jack about annoying the settlers and to prevent any further 
hostile action. On April 3, 1872, Major Elmer Otis met with Captain Jack 
and repeated to him the complaints and warned the chief that "he must 
control his men thoroughly," adding that ••• "the troops /;ere ther.i/ to 
secure ••• quiet and good order. 1133 Captain Jack denied the charges, and 
a Mister Ball and a Henry Miller, residing some six miles and ten miles 
respectively from Jack's headquarters corroborated Captain Jack's 
explanation that other Indians were responsible for the depradations, 
and testified to Jack's peaceable attitude. 34 
After meeting with the Modocs, Major Otis was of the opinion that 
"if left where they now are, it will probably lead to a serious out-
break.1135 
The presence of troops in the region prevented any further incidents 
and the summer of 1872 was passed peacefully. 
Despite the reconunendation by Meacham proposing location of the 
Modocs on a Lost River Reservation, and despite the knowledge held by 
the Department of Indian Affairs that Captain Jack positively would not 
32Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath., 361. 
33House Executive Documents, 43rd Cong, 1st Sess., 21-22. 
34.lbJJi,, 22-23. 
35ll1!d, •• 21. 
ll 
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go back on any p~rt of the Klamath Reservation, Odeneal received on 
September 6, 1872, an order from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
instructing him "to remove the Modoc Indians to Camp Yainax on Klamath 
Reservation, peaceable if you can, but forcibly if you must."36 Acting 
accordingly Odeneal sent J. D. Applegate, a rancher in the area, to the 
Modoc camp to order Jack to meet with him. 
Captain Jack reportedly replied, "we do not want to see him or talk 
to himi we do not want any white man to tell us what to do; our friends 
and advisers are in Yreka, California; they tell us to stay here, and 
we intend to do it, and will not go on the Reservation; we are tired of 
talk, and we are done talking. "37 There is no evidence linking Elisha 
Steele, to whom Jack was undoubtedly referring in this speech, with this 
advice. 
Immediately after receiving this reply, Odeneal, on November 27, 
1872, requested the military in Southern Oregon to "arrest Captain Jack, 
Black Jim, and Scar-faced Charley and hold them subject to my order ••• 
I think they might be induced to surrender and come on the reservation 
without further trouble,"38 On the following day Odeneal received this 
reply from Fort Klamath: ,.In compliance with your written request of 
yesterday, I will state that Captain Jackson will leave this post about 
noon today with about thirty men; will be at Link River tonight, and I 
hope before morning at Captain Jack's camp ••• John Green, Major, First 
Cavalry, Commanding Posi."39 
36 Ibid., 38. 
37Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath., 362. 
38House Executive Documents, 43rd Cong, 1st Sess, 38. 
39Meacham, Annual Report, 1873., 74. 
.!2. 
Captain Jackson left Fort Klamath at 11 a.m., November 28, 1872 with 
Lieutenant John Boutelle, guide Ivan Applegate, and thirty-six troopers. 
At dawn on the 29th they arrived at the Modoc Camp, creating a "great 
commotion" among the Indians. At this point there are varying accounts 
of what actually happened. Jeff Riddle,reconstructis the conversation: 
"Captain Jackson, 'now Jack lay down your gun here; ' Jack, 'what for?'; 
Jackson, 'you are the chief, you lay your gun down, all your men to the 
same;' Jack, 'why do you want to disarm me, I have never fought white 
people yet, and I do not want to;' Jackson, 'if you believe what you 
say, Jack, you will give up your gun. I won't let anyone hurt you.'"40 
According to Riddle, every Indian laid down his gun except Scarface 
Charley who kept an old revolver strapped on. When Jackson ordered him 
to take the pistol off, Scarface answered, "You got my gun. This pistol 
all lite. Me no shoot him you."41 Jackson ordered Boutelle to disarm 
the Modoc. Boutelle stepped forward and swore, "Here Injun, give that 
pistol here damn you, quick?"42 Scarface laughed, "Me no dog, me man, 
••• You talk to me I just like a dog. Me no dog. Talk me good. I 
listen you. "43 Boutelle unlimbered his own revolver, saying, "You son 
of a bitch, I will Show you not to talk back to me!"44 and he leveled 
the gun at the Indian's chest. Scarface by this time had his own revolver 







out, and "at the same instant, both pistols made but one report, 1145 and 
neither man was hit. Meacham agrees substantially with Riddle's whole 
account saying, "Scarface was enraged at the vile epithets applied him 
••• at all events," the pistols were discharged "so nearly simultaneous 
that even L.Boutell.,J' does not know who fired first. 1146 
However, Jackson maintains, "Captain Jack, Scarfaced Charley, Black 
Jim and some others would neither lay down their arms, nor surrender, 
and some of them commenced making hostile demonstrations against us, 
and finally opened fire. 1147 
There is no way of learning the facts of this encounter, but the 
truth probably lies somewhere between Meacham's and Riddle's account 
and Captain Jackson's report. Certainly the Modocs had been jarred out 
of a sound sleep by the arrival of the troopers, and became apprehensive 
because word had reached them that the soldiers would force them back 
on the reservation. With this in mind, it might be safe to say that 
some of the Modocs did keep their guns and were reluctant to obey 
Jackson's orders. However, according to Boutelle's own story (which 
was used to introduce this chapter) the Modocs did not open fire first, 
and did not start shooting until after the argument between Scarface 
and Boutelle, thus refuting Jackson's statement. 
The Boutelle-Scarface fracas launched the Modoc War, and Jackson 
writes, "I poured volley after volley among the hostile Indians, took 
45Ibid. 
46Meacham, Wigwam and WarQath., 369. 
47House Executive Documents, 43rd Cong, 1st Sess, 43-44. 
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their camp, killed eight or nine warriors, and drove the rest into the 
hills ••• I had one man killed, and seven wounded ••• ffioweveiJ, my force 
was too weak to pursue and capture the Indians that made off, owing to 
the necessity of taking immediate care of the wounded and protecting 
the few citizens who had collected at Crawley•s ranch ••• From the best 
information I can get, Captain Jack, Scarfaced Charley and Black Jim 
are killed or mortally wounded. 1148 
Meacham says, "Jackson lost ten killed and five wounded, and on 
the reappearance of the Indians a few hours later, drew off his forces, 
leaving the Modocs in possession of the battlefield. 1149 
Details of this engagement then are conflicting and also obscure 
because Jackson's boasts of killing the Modoc leaders were obviously 
false, as were other parts of his report, indicating his judgment might 
have been swayed by the recent heat of battle; Meacham's report of ten 
soldiers killed was likewise false, as was his inference that the Modocs 
forced the cavalrymen to retire or be killed. If there were a choice 
between either the Meacham-Riddle or Jackson accounts of the entire 
November 29th episode as to which was closer to the truth, the choice 
would lie with Meacham and Riddle, for a supposedly unimpeachable source 
claims Captain Jackson was drunk on the morning of November 29, 1872. 50 
The variety of accounts dealing with this first chapter make it 
extremely difficult to pin down one person or party as guilty in pro-
voking the Modoc War. 
48.lll.!sl. 
49Meacham, Wigwam and warpath. , 369. 
50Johnson, History Klamath Indian Reservation., 86, footnote 130. 
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Conceptions of the Modocs as a much-maligned, defenseless, and 
completely docile tribe pushed into war in an attempt to save their 
ancestral hunting and fishing grounds are not correct. Several points 
indicate that the Modocs must share a part of the blame for the tragedy 
begun on November 29. 
Captain Jack almost inunediately violated two sections of the 1864 
Council Grove Treaty by leaving the Klamath Reservation for three years 
in 1866. The section read, "they (the Indian tribes signing the treaty) 
[a.greiJ that they will submit to and obey all laws and regulations 
which the United States may prescribe for their government and conduct. 
The tribes agree/[t,.iJ remove to said reservation and remain thereon, 
unless temporary leave of absence is granted to them by the Super-
intendent or agent in charge of the tribes."51 During the years 1864 
to 1872 Captain Jack and the Modocs were repeatedly requested by 
governmental authorities to return to the reservation and abide by the 
I 
dictates of the treaty. This the Modocs refused to do, partly on the 
grounds that they did not fully understand the treaty and therefore 
could not be expected to abide by it. Captain Jack consistently relied 
on this reasoning despite the fact that the treaty had been fully 
explained and interpreted to the Modocs; despite the fact that Jack 
had affixed his mark to the treaty under his Indian name, Kientpoos; 
and despite the fact that inunediately after signing the treaty, the 
Modocs received tools, seeds, clothing and provisions in lieu of forth-
coming payments by the United States government. 
51JbjJi., 191-199. 
These evasive answers on the part of Captain Jack and the Modocs 
illustrate the tendency of the Modocs to shift the blame for criminal 
acts from themselves to other parties. For example, during the summer 
of 1872, Jack's band caused the Lost River settlers no end of annoyance 
by their depradations. When confronted with the evidence, the Modocs 
claimed the Pit River Indians were actually the guilty ones; and early 
in 1872 when asked to return to the Reservation, Jack replied that his 
friends in Yreka had advised him to stay put, although there is abso-
lutely no evidence of the "friends" counseling Jack to defy the author-
ity of the United States Government. 
Another point against the Modocs is their unreasonable attitude 
toward governmental attempts to bring them back on the Klamath Reser-
vation. Several times during the years 1870-1871, A. B. Meacham, a 
respected figure among the Modocs, pleaded with the tribe to return, 
promising protection and a worthwhile and profitable life. But the 
Modocs refused. 
Possibly contributing to this attitude was the unruliness of the 
Modocs. Time and time again in the 1864-1872 period the Modocs caused 
grief and consternation among the white settlers because of their 
annoyances, and this accounts for the biggest share of Modoc guilt in 
perpetrating the war. Unwilling to give up their unfettered way of 
life, the Modocs forced the United States to take appropriate action 
that would protect the settlers health and property in the Modoc 
region. In this indirect manner, the Modocs were responsible for the 
shots being fired on November 29, 1872. 
But despite this evidence, it seems that an even greater share of 
.il 
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the guilt for causing the war can be traced to the United States govern-
ment and the Klamath Indians. 
During the two brief Modoc tenures on the Klamath Reservation, the 
United States government represented by 0. C. Knapp, and the Klamath 
Indians directly violated important sections of the 1864 treaty which 
stated, in essence, that all products of the land belonged to the tribe 
working the land, and if there were violations of this law the Indian 
Agent in charge would protect the tribe whose land and privileges were 
being usurped. The Klamaths, of course, violated this section by 
stealing log rails from the Modocs. When the Modocs appealed for 
redress to Agent Knapp, he refused. 
From Knapp and the Klamaths, the Modocs learned to distrust all 
white overtures that would have them come back to the reservation. 
Reinforcing this distrust, and hanging like a cloud over the entire 
Modoc affair was the memory of the Ben Wright Massacre. The legacy of 
this Massacre made the Modocs cautious when listening to the white man, 
and undoubtedly made it easier for them to refuse his solutions that 
would result in peace. 
But in spite of these deterrents to peace, the Modoc War was 
probably not an "irrepressible conflict." Four hypotheses back up 
this statement. First, if Modoc rights had been even adequately pro-
tected on the reservation the second stampede quite probably would not 
have occurred in 1870, and a logical extension of this theory would see 
the Modocs still on the reservation, war averted, and permanent peace 
secured. Second, had the United States Government exhibited strong 
military force at critical points during the Modoc difficulties war 
r 
might have been averted. For example, had a powerful detachment of 
troopers been used to return the Modocs after their excursion of 1866, 
the Indians might have been impressed by the United States. and caused 
no more trouble. Third, had the Indian agents been thoroughly instructed 
in the mores of the Indian, a harmony between Indian and white theories 
might have been achieved that could have prevented the war. Fourth, and 
most important, if the government had granted the Modocs their desired 
reservation on Lost River, the whole area might have been peaceful for 
years to come, but the Washington officials procrastinated, and finally 
there was war. 
But even if there was war, the Department of the Interior, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the military were not worried. 
However, the patriarch of the Applegate clan, Jesse, took a different 
point of view and wrote prophetically: "No kind of force can pursue 
as fast as they can retreat, and the military force on the Pacific is 
insufficient to hunt them out and rout them from their fastnesses ••• "52 
52House Executive Documen~ 43rd Cong, 1st Sess,. 13-14. 
CJI,APTER II PREI .IlDE TO DISASTER 
After the engagement with the troops on Lost River, the Modoc 
women and children utilized dugout canoes to float down the river 
toward Tule Lake and safety in the lava beds. 
Captain Jack's men who fought the soldiers on the west side of 
Lost River, including Schonchin John, Scar-face Charley, Black Jim, 
One-eyed Mose, and eleven others retreated directly to the lava beds, 
commiting no depradations of any kind. However, the Modocs on the east 
bank led by Old Longface, Boston Charley, Hooker Jim, Slolux and ten 
other warriors made their retreat a blood-bath. At ten a.m., on 
November 29 with Hooker Jim in the van, the Indians descended on Mr. 
Boddy's farm south of Lost River, killed Boddy, dragged him into the 
woods, and confronted Mrs. Boddy with "their garments covered with the 
life-blood of their victims." Bogus Charley said, "Don't be afraid 
Mrs. Boddy, we won't hurt you. We're not soldiers. We men never fight 
white women; never fight white girl or baby. Will kill women's men, 
you bet! Soldier kill our women, gal, baby, too. We no do that. All 
I want is something to eat. You give, I go. Maybe I see white man; I 
like kill him. No like kill white woman."53 Mrs. Boddy gave Bogus 
53Riddle, Indian Histoty, 47. 
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flour and sugar; he then thanked her and went on his way. 
Not stopping with Boddy the Modocs killed ten more settlers by sun-
down of the 29th.54 
Illustrating that the fear pervading the entire region was not 
limited to the whites, Alexander McKay reported to the military at Fort 
Klamath on December 5, 1872, "Gents; yesterday p.m., Messrs, Fairchild, 
Ball, Davis, and Culver of .Liiot Creei/ Oregon started from this place 
with the Indians who have lived here and in this vicinity, some forty-
five in number for the reservation at Fort Klamath. When the party 
reached Bob Whittle's on Link River, the Indian Agent CL. S. Dyar) met 
them and told them that there was a party who would mob them if they 
undertook to cross the river, and there were also eight or ten men at 
Whittle's who opposed the party proceeding. The gentlemen above men-
tioned then undertook to enter some arrangement to run the Indians 
through and avoid Linkville, but the bucks became frightened and broke, 
and are now scattered all over the country, except a few who came back 
with the squaws and children in charge of Mr. Culvert. 1155 Fourteen of 
these Indians, CHot Creeks) disillusioned by the threats of the Linkville 
citizens went to Captain Jack's camp where Curly-haired Doctor told 
them he would make medicine to protect them if they would join the Modocs. 
The Hot Creeks agreed, and with the arrival of Hooker Jim's marauding 
band, the total fighting force of the Modocs numbered fifty-three. 56 
54Ibid., 49. 
55ijgase ExeRutive Documents, 1st Sess., 43rd Cong., 30-31. 
56Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath, 376. 
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Captain Jack when told of Hooker Jim's raid, denounced Hooker's 
warriors, particularly for the killing of Mr. Henry Miller who had been 
a good friend to the Modocs. He declared that the men who had connnitted 
these "outrageous" crimes "should be surrendered for trial; that a great 
mistake had been made; and that unless these men were given up the 
whole band would be lost. 1157 But Captain Jack's proposal to surrender 
the errant warriors was voted down by a large majority. 
After all the Modocs who would come arrived at the lava beds, a 
heavily armed burial party was sent out to find the bodies of the Modoc 
victims. The reports of this group, as described by Meacham, fostered 
the feeling of terror in the region and made revenge a thought uppermost 
in the minds of the settlers: "on arriving at the grove of timber where 
Brotherton was killed, they found his body lying cold, with his glassy 
eyes wide open. He had been pierced by four Modoc bullets. Near him 
was found his axe, with the handle painted with his own blood. Then 
another was found on a wagon lying across the coupling poles with his 
face downwards. He, too, was stripped of his clothing. Another was 
found a few rods from his work with his bowels beside him, and his heart 
taken from his body, and hacked to pieces. This was the work of Hooker 
Jim. "58 Meacham's next comment is interesting, "My humane, kind-hearted 
reader, who has a soul overflowing with kindness that goes out for 
'Lo! the poor Indian,' look on this scene a moment ••• and tell me truly ••• 
do you still have hard words for the pioneers who brave these dangers?1159 
57.illJi., 375. 
58.llu.d.,' 378. 
59 lb.lil, I 379. 
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Meacham implies that this type of tragedy has been repeated "over and 
over again. "60 and that the Indians should at least share the guilt 
with the Government and settlers. 
A solid citizen, in a Linkville saloon, outlined the problems of 
the coming campaign cogently but without Meacham1 s eloquence: "Captain 
Jack ain't on open ground now; not by a damn sight. He's in the all-
firedest place in the world. You've been to 'Devil's garden' at the 
head of Sprague River haven't you? Well, that place ain't a patchen to 
that ere place where the Injuns is now. I've been there and I tell you 
it's nearly all litenin 1 , all rocks and caves, and you can't lead a 
horse through it in a week--and then the Injuns knows every inch of the 
ground, and when they get in them there caves, why it 'taint no use 
talking, I tell you, you can't kill nary an Injum--you can't! I'm 
a-goin down just to see the fun. 1161 
But the United States military took a different point of view. 
Lieutenant John~. Adams, the Commanding officer at Fort Klamath, began 
plans for a force that would crush the Modocs, by requesting o_n December 
1, 1872, that Lieutenant Colonel Frank Wheaton, Commanding Camp Warner, 
proceed with all available troops to Captain Jack's camp. Adams believed 
that with reinforcements from his own outpost Wheaton should be able peace-
fully to coerce the Modocs into submission-"It is not believed that 
more than a show of military force will be necessary ••• " Adams also 
explained Wheaton's objective more fully as "bompe_llin.,g/ Captain Jack 
60 llu..q., 381. 
61llu.d,., 383-384. 
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and his people to recognize Superintendent Odeneal'3 authority, without 
bloodshed, if it is possible." Adams further illustrates the military 
opinion of the Modocs by writing in the same letter, "Should the presence 
of Captain Jackson's force of cavalry (now numbering twenty-five soldiers) 
in the Modoc country already have accomplished all that Mr. Odeneal 
desires, and Captain Perry's reinforcements not be required, you will 
please direct its return to Camp Warner."62 
By the beginning of the new year 1873, Colonel Wheaton and a force 
of 400 armed men were closing in on the lava beds. Of this force, about 
250 were regular troops, 120 Oregon militiamen, and 25 California 
volunteers under John Fairchild's direct command. The Oregon_ militia, 
though under Wheaton's command was divided into two companies; Harrison 
Kelly captain of one, and Oliver Applegate of the other. Included in 
Applegate's command were Klamath Indian scouts. 63 
These troops were concentrated in two camps, one under a Colonel 
Barnard at the South end of Tule Lake about five miles east of Captain 
Jack's stronghold, and the other under Wheaton at Van Bremer's ranch, 
fifteen miles due West. 
Wheaton encountered difficulty in getting supplies, howitzers, and 
ammunition into the two camps for the Modocs began to cover all the 
available roads. On December 22, 1872, a Captain Bernard's supply wagon 
was within a mile of camp when Wheaton claims sixty-five armed Modocs 
62House Executive Documents. 1st Sess., 43rd Cong., 40. 
63.lbJJl., 48-51. 
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attacked the detail. Wheaton also claims that ten mounted troopers led 
by Lieutenant Kyle easily chased the sixty-five Modocs from one rocky 
ledge to another.64 
In the same dispatch to General Canby, dated December 26, 1872, 
Wheaton said, "Unless the Modocs crawl off South through the lava beds, 
on our approach, we hope to make short work of them very soon after our 
ammunition comes up ••• I am confident of soon clearing them out of that 
country."65 
On January 15, 1873, Wheaton wrote to Canby, "I am happy to announce 
that after all our annoying delays, we are now in better condition than 
I ever saw troops for a movement against hostile Indians."66 By this 
time howitzers and ammunition had arrived and Wheaton was ready to press 
the attack on January 17. 
Wheaton painted the prospects for the battle in glowing terms, "Now 
our artillery pack-train and howitzer details are admirably drilled, we 
leave for Captain Jack's Gibralter tomorrow morning, and a more enthusi-
astic, jolly set of regulars and volunteers, I never had the pleasure 
to command. 
"If only the Modocs will try to make good their boast to whip a 
thousand soldiers, all will be satisfied ••• Our scouts and friendly 
Indians insist that the Modocs will fight us desperately, but I don't 
understand how they can think of attempting any serious resistance, 
though, of course, we are prepared for their fight or flight ••• No effort 
on our part can prevent the Modocs from crawling out and scattering; 
we will do all we can to prevent it ••• I hope in forty-eight hours to be 
64.lll.id.., 49. 
65.!ll!.d. 
661.ll!s1. , 49-50. 
able to send you satisfactory information. 1167 
A conversation between John Fairchild, a veteran rancher of the 
area, and several volunteers, indicates that Wheaton's enthusiasm had 
caught on in the rank-and-file; despite the cautiousness of men like 
Fairchild. A captain of volunteers announced, "I have but one fear, and 
that is that I can't restrain my men, they are so eager to get at 'em; 
they will eat the Modocs up raw, if I let 'em go." Fairchild replied, 
"Don't fret, you can hold them; they won't be hard to keep back when the 
Modocs open fireo" Another volunteer asked, "I say Jim, are you going 
to carry grub?" Jim, speaking scornfully, "No, I am going to take 
Modoc sirloin for my dinner." Still another volunteer chimed in, "I 
think that I'll take mine rare." Fairchild sarcastically got the last 
word, "Never you fear, ••• them Modocs are sure rarin' and they sure know 
how to rare!1168 
67.lJ.l.iJl_., 50. 
68Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath, 386. 
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- CHAPTER III THE FIGHTING 
On January 12, 1872, Wheaton had issued General field-order, No. 3~9 
containing the strategy he thought would force the Modocs to surrender. 
All troops were ordered from their camps east and west of the lava 
beds to positions on the immediate perimeter preparatory to the attack 
at dawn on January 17. Wheaton also ordered every precaution taken to 
prevent the Indians from discovering the number of soldiers and their 
precise location. 70 
Part V of the General order instructed Major E. C. Mason's Battalion, 
Twenty-first Infantry; a detachment of twenty men from F Company, Twenty-
first Infantry; General John Ross' Oregon volunteer militia; and a 
battery of mountain howitzers to march from Van Bremer•s Ranch and be 
ready for the attack January 17. Wheaton ordered Mason's Twenty-first 
battalion to lead the attack followed by the militia, the mountain-
howitzers packed, and Captain Perry's F troop, First Cavalry. Assuming 
the troops could reach a position near the Modoc camp Wheaton ordered the 
force to deploy on the right of the infantry battalion in close skirmish 
69House Ex@CUtive Documents., 1st Sess., 43rd Cong., 53. 
70.lb.J.g_. 
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order with the whole line executing a left half-wheel to connect with 
the right of the main force and surround the Modocs. 71 (see diagram> 
Captains R. F. Bernard and James Jackson commanding detachments 
of the First Cavalry and Klamath Indian Scouts on the east side of the 
lava beds, were ordered into position January 16 prior to the attack 
the following day. From a position not more than two miles from the 
Modoc fortifications and with the right resting on or near Tule Lake, 
these troops were to execute a right half-wheel connecting with the 
troops on the West and capturing any canoes the Modocs might use to 
escape. 72 
Except for miscellaneous details, Wheaton concluded the order: 
"After the first three shots have been fired from the howitzer battery, 
as a signal to the troops attacking on the east side of the Modoc camp, 
firing will cease for fifteen minutes, and an Indian scout directed to 
notify the nearest Modocs that ten minutes will be allowed them ••• to 
surrender. ,,73 
At four-thirty a.m., January 17 in intensely cold weather, the 
"fall in" sounded in both the eastern and western army camps and the 
troops moved off on a short march to the jumping-off point. By dawn, 
to the dismay of Wheaton and his troopers, the lava beds were completely 
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Despite this obstacle the attack began at 8 a.m., but no Modoc could 
be seen, A volunteer remarked, "I knew they wouldn't stand and fight 
when the volunteers got after them, they knew we was a comin'. 1175 
But the Indians hadn't left. 
Suddenly Modoc sharpshooters began to fire, taking a heavy toll of 
Mason's troop;on the West, and Bernard's on the East. 76 
Mason's soldiers, after advancing about a mile and a half over 
broken and rocky country, began to find the advance increasingly difficult 
to maintain. Mason says, "Lth!d volcanic rock was piled so as to afford 
complete shelter and protection to the Indians who could thus hold 
their place until our line was within a few feet of them and then deliver 
their fire with deadly effect. 1177 Mason's attempt to move the battalion 
by the left flank and effect a junction with Bernard was hindered by 
a rocky ridge on the shore of the lake, the ridge being held by the 
Modocs. However, Mason finally made contact with Bernard's right, only 
to find that his movement had not been followed by the majority of troops 
with which he had been operating; thus the same gap between the western 
and eastern forces existed that had been there at 8 a.m. 
Bernard's troops, about 100 men and officers, had advanced about 
100 yards to a deep gorge when the Modocs opened fire. Finding the 
gorge impassable the troops fell back 150 yards, established a strong 
position, and spent the rest of the day watching Major Mason attempt to 
75Ibid,, 403. 
76six men were killed and many wounded in the opening volley by the 
Modocs. 
77H2use Executive Documents, 1st Sess., 43rd Cong., 61 
American troops constructed this outpost under 
heavy enemy fire, January 18, 1873. 
pass the Modocs entrenched on the ridge. 78 
At five p.m., Wheaton ordered the troops to retreat from the lava 
beds and retire to their respective camps. 
Official recapitulation by Wheaton listed nine privates killed, 
three officers wounded, six non-commissioned officers wounded, and 
twenty-one privates wounded. 79 
The Modocs sustained no casualties. 
Bernard, in his report to Wheaton, wrote, "I have wished, respect-
fully, to say that the place the Indians now occupy cannot be taken 
by a force of less than 700 men and to take the place by an assault 
with this force will cost half the command in killed and wounded. A 
large force, judiciously handled, moving at night by approaches, piling 
up rocks to protect themselves so they can operate during the day, may 
take the place."80 
Major Mason concurred with Bernard's opinion writing that he would 
leave it to others to find words that would convey an adequate idea of 
the impassible character of the country over which the operations were 
conducted, and which make the "Modoc position a second Gibralter."81 
Beaten and discouraged, but wiser, Colonel Wheaton reported to 
Canby "I have been twenty-three years in the service of the government 
... J;nif in this service I have never before encountered an enemy, 






bullets! Where is the Modoc that has been struck with the white man's 
bullets? I told you 'Soch-a-la Tyee' (the Great Spirit) was on our 
side ••• We can kill all the white men that come. 1184 
Caught up in exultant mood, Schonchin John exclaimed, "I felt strong 
when I saw the fog that our medicine-man had brought over the rocks 
yesterday morning. I knew we could kill the soldiers! We are Modocs!"85 
When the Modoc warriors had reviewed their exploits in the battle, 
Captain Jack rose to speak. Ill at ease, and not sharing in the happy 
atmosphere, the Modoc Chief accurately put his finger on the reason 
Indian tribes have consistently failed to halt the advance of American 
civilization, and the reason why the Modocs would ultimately fail in 
their fight: "It is true we have kiled many white men. The Modoc 
heart is strongi the Modoc guns were sure; the bullets went straight 
[ani/ we are all here. But hear me, my people. The white men are many; 
they will not give up; they will come again; more will come the next 
time. No matter how many the Modocs kill, more will come each time and 
we will all be killed after a while ••• 1186 Many of the Modocs reacted 
to this statement by ridiculing their chief, pushing him to the ground 
and calling him an "old squaw" and other like insults. Finally, when 
the Modoc victory dance began, Captain Jack was absent, and more 
important, his authority and leadership had been seriously weakened by 
his seemingly timid statements. 
84 .lll.id- , 408 • 
85.llu..d. ' 409. 
86~., 409. 
rhe outcropping of rock in the foreground was 
occupied by a lone Modoc warrior. 
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as the Modoc Stronghold, nor have I ever seen troops engage a better-
armed or more skillful foe. "82 Possibly in an attempt to save his self-
respect, Wheaton continued in his report that due to the length of the 
line defended by the Modocs and the ferocity of their resistance he 
would estimate that his troops had encountered a fighting force of not 
less than 150 Indians. Actually, there were fifty-three Modocs opposing 
the soldiers. 
Wheaton's disconsolate attitude was reflected in the soldier's 
camps. A captain in the Oregon militia caustically asked a volunteer, 
"How did you like your 'Modoc Sirloin' eh? putty good, eh? Didn't 
take it raw, did you? ••• Wonder if those boys who were spoiling for a 
fight are out of danger?" Not content with deriding the enlisted vol-
unteers, the captain approached a volunteer officer and wondered, "Where 
was ..IQ.Y. during the fight anyhow? ••• Donal' McKay ••• said you was down on 
the point ••• and that he saw some of you raise your heads once in awhile 
and look around and then Shacknasty Jim would shoot, and you would all 
lie down again."83 
In sharp contrast to the pained feelings in the army camps, Captain 
Jack's Modocs were jubilant. Immediately after the main body of troops 
had left the battlefield Hooker Jim, Bogus Charley, Boston Charley and 
ot~er Modocs swarmed over the dead and wounded soldiers, taking their 
coats, arms, ammunition and in a few cases their hair. Curly-haired 
Doctor opened the celebration when all had returned to the Stronghold, 
claiming, "I promised you a medicine that would turn the white man's 
82.!b.!sl. ' 55. 
83Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath, 412. 
Intoxicated by their victory over the soldiers, the Modocs did not 
guess that a determined Wheaton would, on January 19, ask General Canby 
for 300 additional soldiers to rout the Modocs out of their caves. 
Eventually, Wheaton, or whoever commanded the army in the Modoc area, 
would have either killed or captured all the Modocs as Captain Jack 
predicted, but a dispatch from Secretary of Interior, Columbus Delano, 
halted hostilities, and set the stage for a tragic chapter in the war. 
Embarrassed by the defeat at the lava beds, Delano wrote to Secretary 
of War, William Belknap: '' ••• with a view of stopping, if possible, the 
further effusion of blood and again establishing peace between the 
Indians and whites, I have decided to send to the scene of difficulties, 
a commission.consisting of three persons."87 Delano also requested that 
offensive operations against the Modocs by the military cease until the 
commissioners arrive at the lava beds and determine if peace could 
result without further use of force. 
Delano immediately selected General Canby as advisor to the comm-
ission, and on January 29, 1873 outlined to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs the specific goals of the commission, which were: ~To ascertain 
the causes which have led to the difficulties and hostilities ••• the 
most effective and judicious measures for preventing Lthei_r7 ••• continuance 
and for the restoration of peace La~ to make an amicable arrangement 
for locating the Indians, with their consent, on some portion of a 
reservation lying between Capt Lookout on the north, Cape Perpetua on 
87House Execytive Documents, 1st Sess., 43rd Cong., 65, 
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rocks in the background. 
on the south on the Oregon coast, and bounded by the Pacific Ocean ••• 
and the Coast Range of Mountains. "88 Force, or a display of force could 
be used, only as a last resort. 
The reason for the governmental shift in attitude from forceful 
to peaceful measures was a meeting between John Fairchilds, Press 
Darres, a rancher in the area, and Captain Jack. Captain Jack speaking 
presumably without the assent of his warriors, told Fairchilds that he 
wanted to listen to their side of the story; that he did not want war; 
that he would pay for the cattle killed; and that he only wanted to 
live in peace on Lost River.89 
Captain Jack's conciliatory speech plus the fact that two white 
men had talked to a Modoc without a formal peace arrangement helped 
convince Delano that the peaceful way was the best way. 
A. B. Meacham, then in Washington, was appointed Chairman of the 
Commission to the Modocs and upon his recommendation, Delano appointed 
to the commission, Jesse Applegate, a "man Lwit.!!/ long experience and 
success in the management of Indians ••• "90 
On February 5, 1873, Meacham left Washington for the lava beds 
"fully realizing the danger attending ••• "91 
88.l,bjJ!., 65-66. 
89Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath, 413-414. 
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CHAP'J;'ER VI THE ASSASSINATION 
Meacham's premonitions proved to be correct, and today three miles 
due Northwest of Captain Jack's Stronghold in the Lava Beds, on a 
relatively level, consistently dusty plain bordered on each side by 
grotesque lava formations reaching occasionally to a height of 35 feet, 
stands a monument to General E. R. S. Canby and Reverend Eleazer Thomas. 
This monument serves as a memorial to Ganby and Thomas, who were 
murdered by Modoc Indians on April 11, 1873. 
The official charges lodged against these Modocs at their trial 
beginning July 5, 1873, at Fort Klamath were: "Charge First: 'Murder 
in violation of the laws of war.• The specification is the murder of 
General E. R. S. Canby and Dr. Eleazer Thomas. 
"Charge Second: 'Assault with intent to kill in violation of the 
laws of war. ' 
"Specification Second: 'Assault on the Commissioners.' 'Attempt 
to kill A. B. Meacham and L. S. Dyar.' 
"All this at or near the Lava Beds, so-called, in the State of 
California on or about the 11th day of April 1873. ••92 
92House Executive Documents, 43rd Cong., 1st Ses., 134-136. 
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To these charges, the accused Modocs pleaded "not guilty"--a plea 
which was shown to be a direct lie by the testimony of A. B. Meacham, 
Chairman of the Special Commission to the Modocs, L. S. Dyar, the Indian 
Agent at Klamath Agency, Frank and Toby Riddle, (Wi-Ne-Ma) interpreters 
at the peace conference, four Modoc Indians who turned state's evidence, 
and of course, the mute testimony of the bullet-ridden, stripped, and 
mutilated bodies of General Canby and Dr. Thomas, found dead April 11, 
1873, by troopers of General Gillem's commandrushed to the rescue at 
the "double-quick."93 
However, the important story to be told in relation to the so-called 
"Canby Massacre" is not that captain Jack and his cohorts were guilty 
of murder, but rather what (1) led to the arrangement of a peace con-
ference, (2) what prompted the Modocs to resort to treachery, (3) what 
actually happened at the peace conference, and (4) why did the Commission-
ers elect to meet the Modocs at all on April 11, realizing as they did, 
that their lives might be in jeopardy? 
The need for an immediate settlement of difficulties between the 
United States Government and the Modoc Indians became sharply apparent 
on January 17, 1873, when a combination of fog, lava formations, over-
confidence, and Modoc bullets resulted in a humiliating defeat for the 
United States Army. Every officer and trooper stationed near the lava 
beds was aware that the Modocs had lodged themselves in one of the most 
defensible positions to be found anywhere in the world, and that any 
attack launched to force the Modoes out of the lava beds would inevitably 
add to the list of killed and wounded. Realizing this, Secretary of the 
93A. B. Meacham, Wigwam ang Warpath., 609. 
Interior Delano's Peace Commission sought first to devise a method of 
preventing any major hostilities during their attempts to confer with 
the Modocs and reach an effective peace agreement. 94 
To initiate peace talks with the Modocs, Bob Whittle and his Indian 
wife, Matilda, were sent to the Modoc camp February 19 with instructions: 
first, to inform the Modocs of the presence of the commission and the 
commission's desire to arrange a council-meeting with the view of adjust-
ing the difficulties that existed, and to prevent a re-opening of 
hostilities; and second, to ascertain with whom the Modocs would prefer 
to arrange the contemplated council. 
Whittle and his wife returned from the Modoc camp with the news that 
the Indians were willing and anxious to meet with "Frank Riddle (white 
husband of Wi-Ne-Ma, a Modoc woman) and John Fairchilds to conclude 
details for the proposed meeting. On February 21, Fairchilds left for 
the Modoc stronghold, accompanied by a Modoc woman, Artina, with a 
reply to the Modocs, stating that "no act of war will be allowed while 
peace talks are being had, no movements of troops will be made. We come 
in good faith to make peace. Our hearts are all for peace." The note 
was signed by A. B. Meacham. 95 
When Fairchilds and his party returned on February 23, he reported 
that the Modocs wanted peace most urgently, but that a meeting had not 
been arranged "because they were unwilling to come out of the lava-
beds. "96 
94H. H. Bancroft, History of Oregon XXX. (San Francisco, 1888). 596. 
95Meacham, Annual Report, 1873., 74-75. 
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With matters at a standstill, Judge Elisha Steele, a long time 
friend of the Modocs who lived in Yreka, was sent for in the hope that 
he might arrange a meeting. On March 4, Judge Steele arrived at 
commission headquarters and met with the Board of Commissioners now 
including Meacham, Jesse Applegate, Samuel Case and Judge John 
Roseborough, who was added to the commission at the request of General 
Canby. 
After deliberation on what course to follow, the Board voted to 
send Steele as a messenger to arrange a council with the Modocs and also 
to offer terms for peace which were; " ••• a general amnesty to all 
Modocs on condition of their full and complete surrender and consent to 
remove to a distant reservation within the limits of Oregon or California." 
On the vote as to whether to include this authorization, Roseborough, 
Case, and Applegate voted yes, and Meacham no. Steele was further 
instructed to tell the Modocs that "General Canby would make peace and 
conclude terms" Meacham was again the lone dissenter when a vote was 
taken to include this statement.97 
On March 5, Steele, Frank Riddle and Wi-Ne-Ma, Fairchilds, and 
reporter R.H. Atwell met with the Modocs but were unable to agree on a 
time and place for a council-meeting, so Steele and his group proposed 
the "amnesty terms" to the Modocs which were accepted by Captain Jack, 
even though there was evidence of bitterness and dissatisfaction among 
the Modoc warriors. Steele evidently was not aware of this dissatisfac-
tion or else chose to disregard it, because he reported to commission 
97lb.!g,. 
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headquarters that "Peace was made; they accept." Even while a general 
feeling of relief was sweeping through the army camp, Fairchilds who 
had also been with the peace party disagreed with Steele, and said, 
"There is some mistake, the Modocs have not all agreed to surrender and 
removal." The Modoc messengers who had accompanied Steele's group back 
to conunission headquarters could say nothing definite, when questioned 
about the matter. Steele then proposed to return to the Modoc Stronghold, 
"and settle the matter beyond question."98 
Steele left for the Modoc camp the second time, minus Fairchilds 
who feared the Modocs would misinterpret Steele's first report as an 
"outrage" and inflict bodily harm on their visitors. 
When Steele arrived at the Modoc camp, he realized that he had 
indeed misinterpreted the Modoc reply to the ".amnity proposal," for there 
were hostile demonstrations against Steele and Atwell, and only Steele's 
long and friendly acquaintance with Captain Jack and Scarface Charley 
saved the party from assassination. The following morning, March 5, 
Steele proposed to return to conunission headquarters and bring the 
conunissioners back with him. On this promise Steele and his party were 
allowed to depart peacefully. 
At conunission headquarters, Steele made a full report of his visit 
and concluded, ttthat no meeting could be had, no peace could be made."99 
Despite these reports made to Secretary of Interior Delano that the 
Modocs were unstable and not to be trusted, the Secretary replied to 
conunissioner Meacham, "I do not believe the Modocs mean treachery. The 
98sancroft, History of Oregon,, 600, 
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commission should not be a failure. I think I understand their unwill-
ingness to confide in you. Continue negotiations. Will consult the 
President, and have the War Department confer with General Canby 
tomorrow. C. Delano."100 
On the day following Steele's return from his second visit, a 
delegation of Modocs headed by captain Jack's sister, Mary, appeared at 
commission headquarters and said that if General Canby would send out 
wagons to meet them, they would surrender under the terms offered by 
Steele during his first visit to them., To this proposal, the Commission 
agreed, and a time and place was appointed where the final surrender 
would take place. However, before the appointed day arrived, Modoc 
messengers came to the Commission Headquarters and asked for more time 
because they were busy burying their dead, and caring for their wounded. 
General Canby agreed to the delay, but assured the Modocs that if they 
did not appear on the re-appointed day, he would compel them to do so. 
The day before the Modocs were to appear (probably around March 15) 
Riddle's wife,Toby, warned General Ganby that treachery was intended and 
"no Modocs come; maybe come to steal teams; they no give up." Toby's 
warning was shunted aside, and again there was relief in the army camp 
when the wagons were sent; in fact the "whole country was rejoicing that 
the Modoc War was at last over. 11101 But when the wagons returned, 
there were no Modocs. 
lOOMeacham, Wigwam and Warpath., 430. 
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At this point, negotiations for peace with the Modocs seemed hope-
less, but Secretary of Interior, Delano, instructed the Commissioners 
" ••• to continue negotiations."102 
Following these instructions, General Canby moved the Commission 
headquarters to the more comfortable Van Bramers ranch, a few miles 
East of the lava-beds, and renewed attempts to arrange a council-meeting. 
During this interval, the personnel of the peace commission changed--
Jesse Applegate, confident that peace was a reality, had resigned the 
day before the wagons were sent out, along with Mr. Case. To fill these 
vacancies L. S. Dyar, a United States Indian agent at Klamath, and 
Reverend Doctor Eleazer Thomas, from Northern California, were added to 
the Commission. 
Between March 15 and April 2, two notable advances were made--
troops were moved to within two miles of the Modoc Camp, and the Comm-
issioners met the Modocs under peaceful conditions for the first time. 
This meeting was held April 2, midway between the lava-beds and Comm-
ission headquarters. Due to a severe storm, nothing concrete was 
accomplished during this conference except an agreement to erect a 
council tent for future conferences. On April 4, Captain Jack requested 
that Meacham meet him and a few men at the newly erected council tent. 
After consulting the board, and disregarding Toby's renewed warning, 
Meacham, Fairchilds, and Judge Rosborough with Frank Riddle and Toby 
as interpreters met Jack, six warriors, and various Modoc women at the 
peace tent. 
Opening the conference, Captain Jack remarked that he had been 
,Indicates the difficulty of the terrain, 
American troops had to cross. 
afraid to talk in the presence of Canby and the "Sunday Doctor" Thomas, 
but now he could talk. He continued by reviewing the whole Modoc 
question beginning with the Ben Wright Massacre, mentioning the insults 
of the Klamaths, the failure of Agent Knapp to protect him and his tribe 
while they were on the reservation, continuing that Major Jackson had 
attacked him before he was up on the morning of November 24, 1872, and 
complaining that citizens had taken part in the battle: "No citizens 
been in the fight, no Indian women and children would have been killed, 
no-citizens would have been murdered.'• Jack concluded his speech by say-
ing his partly educated "young men had done a great wrong while in 
hot blood, but I cannot control them any more than bad white men are 
controlled by American laws; I can never live in peace with the Klamaths, 
I want a home, just the same as a white man on Lost River, the soldiers 
taken away, and the war will stop."l03 
Meacham replied to this proposal that since United States soldiers 
and citizens had been wounded on Lost River, Captain Jack could never 
have Lost River unless Hooker Jim's murders surrendered, and submitted 
to trial. After this proposal was interpreted to the Modoc Chief, Jack 
retreated from his Lost River demand and asked if he could have the 
lava-beds as a home saying, "No man will ever want it." Meacham again 
assured Jack that no peace would be made, or soldiers removed until Jack 
and his Modocs left the lava-beds and went to the well-provisioned new 
home promised them by the United States Government. This was not agree-
able to Captain Jack and he remarked, "The Governor of Oregon has 
103Meacham, Wigwam and Warppth., 447-453. 
demanded our blood, and the law is all on one side, it was made by the 
white man for the white man, leaving the Indians all out." Jack's final 
statement was that he could not control his people, and he would die 
with them if no peace was made. 104 
At this meeting, no further conferences were arranged for but on 
the day following Wi-Ne-Ma, the commission's go-between, was sent to 
Captain Jack proposing that he surrender with such others who might decide 
to do so--Jack declined these terms. But this mission was not a complete 
failure, for as she was leaving the camp, Wi-Ne-Ma was warned by a Modoc 
warrior Wheium that treachery was intended against the Peace Commissioners, 
a fact which she reported to Meacham and General Canby. Wi-Ne-Ma' s 
warning was again not accredited by the Cormnissioners.1o5 
On April 6, General G. C. Gillem, in command of the troops at the 
scene informed a Modoc messenger, Bogus Charley, ff that unless peace was 
made very soon the troops would be moved up nearer the Modoc Stronghold 
and that one hundred Warm Springs Indians would be added to the army 
within a few days." This information evidently caused constirnation in 
the Modoc camp, for on April 8 a Modoc visited the Commissioners and 
requested a "peace talk" saying that six unarmed Modocs were at the 
peace tent willing and anxious to make peace. However, a signal officer 
reported that in addition to the Modocs at the peace tent there were 
about twenty other armed Modocs hidden in the lava rocks. Treachery 
was evident, and no meeting or further negotiations were held on 
A ·1 8 106 prl • 
On April 10, the Modocs renewed their proposition for a peace talk 
proposing that, "if the commissioners including General Canby and General 
Gillem would come next day to the council tent unarmed to meet a like 
number of unarmed Modocs thus proving the confidence of the Commission 
in the Modocs, they would all come to headquarters and surrender on the 
day following." After consultation, the Commissioners decided to accept. 
On the fatal morning of April 11, the Commissioners again consulted 
one another on the advisability of attending the meeting. Doctor Thomas 
said it was "a duty which must be performed." General Canby believed, 
"the importance of the object in view, justifies taking some risk." 
Commissioners Dyar and Meacham along with interpreters Frank and Wi-Ne-Ma 
Riddle vociferously opposed attending the meeting and pleaded that if 
the Commissioners must meet the Modocs, they at least go armed. These 
protests were overruled by Canby and Thomas who reminded the dissenters 
that they must keep the spirit of the compact, and furthermore, that a 
strict watch had been kept on the area around the peace tent since dawn 
and the report was "There are only five Indians unarmed at the council 
tent."107 
With their sense of honor leaving them no recourse but to attend, 
Meacham, Dyar, Frank and Toby Riddle., left with Canby and Thomas at 
11:06 a.m. April 11, 1873, to keep their rendezvous with Captain Jack 
and his Modocs. Before departure time arrived, Meacham and Dyar violated 
the spirit of the agreement by secreting derringers (small one shot pistols) 
106eouse .Eacutiye Documents, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 139. 
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on their persons. 
About noon, the commissioners arrived at the tent and were met by 
eight armed, instead of five unarmed Modocs: Captain Jack, Schonchin 
John, Shaclrnasty Jim, Ellen's man, Hooker Jim, Boston Charley, Bogus 
Charley, and Black Jim. 
After both sides maneouvered for favorable positions, the council 
opened, with the Modocs directly facing the peace commissioners. Talk 
began with Meacham referring to Jack's proposition made April 10 to the 
effect that he wanted the soldiers removed, and after this was accomplished, 
the war would stop. While this speech was being delivered and interpreted, 
Hooker Jim left the council area, tied Meacham's previously untethered 
horse securely to a sage brush, put on Meacham's overcoat and remarked, 
"me Meacham now, Bogus you no think me look like Meacham." Meacham 
reacted by saying "·take my hat too," to which the Modoc replied, "I will 
very soon." Meacham took no further notice of Hooker Jim's actions but 
turned to Jack and said, "The President sent the soldiers here, we did 
not bring them; we cannot take them away without his consent, they will 
not harm you if you are peaceable i we wa.nt peace, we do not want war; 
we will find a new home for you; you cannot live in this lava-bed always; 
there are many good places for you, and we will together work out a new 
home. General Canby is the soldier chief, and he is your friend, he 
will talk now." Canby continued the council by remarking, "The President 
sent the soldiers here to see that everything was done right, they are 
your friends and will not harm you ••• I have no doubt that some time you 




Doctor Thomas was the next speaker and said, "I believe the great 
spirit put it in the heart of the President to send us here and make 
peace. I have known General Canby fourteen years, Mr. Meacham eighteen 
years, Mr. Dyar four years. I know all their hearts are good, and I 
know my own heart. We want no more wars. The great spirit made all 
men. He made the red men and the white men. He sees all our hearts and 
knows all we do. We are all brothers, and must live in peace together. 11109 
The restless, nervous, and silent Modocs finally leaped to action 
in the form of Sconchin who shouted, "Take away your soldiers, and then 
we will go and look for another place. We want Hot Creek for a home? 
Take away the soldiers? Give us Hot Creek for a home? Take away the 
soldiers; give us Hot Creek?; 
Meacham - "Hot Creek belongs to white men now, perhaps we cannot 
get it for you." 
Schonchin ... "I have been told we could have it." 
Meacham - "Who told you so? Did Fairchilds or Dorris say you 
could have it?" 
Schonchin - "No they did not, but Nate Beswick says we can have 
it." 
Meacham - "We can see Fairchilds and Dorris about it, and if we 
can not buy it for you we will find another home." 
Schonchin - '(very much exci_ted) "Take away Uo soldiers and give 
us Hot Creek or stop talking?" 
While Frank Riddle was interpreting Schonchin's speech, two Modoc 
warriors advanced from behind the lava rocks to the south bearing as 
many rifles as they could carry. The Commissioners all turned to 
109.ll2JJ1. 
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Captain Jack (he had been standing near to General Canby) and asked, 
"What does this mean?" 
His reply was "Ot-we-kantux-E!" (all ready!); he then pointed his 
revolver at General Canby's head and pulled the trigger but the pistol 
misfired; however, the second shot exploded and the ball from Jack's 
gun struck General Canby just below the left eye wounding him severely. 
Canby was dispatched by Captain Jack's knife, with Ellen's Man's assist-
ance, some distance away from the council tent. Doctor Thomas was shot 
fatally in the left breast and taunted by Boston Charley and Bogus 
Charley, who wondered where his God was now? Commissioner Dyar, 
although hotly pursued by Hooker Jim, managed to escape to the army 
camp on foot as did Frank Riddle. Schonchin wounded Meacham almost 
mortally and Meacham, weak from loss of blood would have been scalped 
by the Modocs had not Wi-Ne-Ma frustrated the attempt by shouting, 
"Soldiers, Soldiers!"lll 
Canby and Thomas, sJripped of their clothing, valuables and hair, 
were found by troopers of General Gillem's command who had been rushed 
to the massacre scene. Meacham was still alive when the soldiers arrived, 
and eventually he recovered from his wounds. 112 
The establishment of Modoc guilt does not complete this chapter of 
the Modoc War. Important questions remain to be answered; questions 
dealing with the "whys" connected with the tragic peace conference of 
April 11, 1873. These cannot always be answered on the basis of sub-
stantiated fact--reliable evidence is not always available, thus logic 
and conjecture must necessarily enter into any summation or conclusions/4 
The germ of the peace conference idea as a possible solution to the 
perplexing Modoc question evidently can be traced to January 25, 1873, 
a week after the Modocs severely defeated the attacking United States 
troops. E. L. Applegate, a brother o·f o. C. and Ivan, was in Washington, 
D.C., at this time as a commissioner of immigration, along with A. B. 
Meacham. Both men proposed a peace commission to Secretary of Interior 
Delano as a possible solution to prevent further bloodshed in the lava-
beds. Delano and General William T. Sherman, head of the War Department, 
agreed to this proposition and immediately appointed Meacham as Special 
Commissioner to the Modocs with the power to organize a commission. 
There is no evidence as to what Delano, Applegate, Sherman or Meacham 
were thinking or hoping when they were formulating plans for the peace 
commission. However, the most logical reason for the Commission's 
formation ~as that the Modoc defensive positions in the lava-beds were 
so inaccessible and so strongly fortified that many more American troopers 
would be killed in any future attempts to storm the Modoc Stronghold. 113 
With the peace commission organized on February 18, 1873, and 
attempting, Ju.~ .!!!2§.1. peaceful means. to arrange a meeting with the 
Modocs why did Captain Jack's band decide to resort to treachery? 
There is no valid information available relating to the atmosphere 
and reasoning prevalent in the Modoc camp between January 18 and April 
11, 1873. The most reliable source is Jeff Riddle's, Indian ftistory 
.Qi. the Mogoc ~. because Riddle was the son of the Modoc Indian 
woman, Wi-Ne-Ma who did have easy access to the Modoc Stronghold. 
113House Executive Documents, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 239-240. 
Presumably Riddle's source of information consists of talks with his , 
mother and his own observations, for he was on the scene, and occasionally 
accn~panied his mother into the Modoc fortress. 
Riddle offers the hypotheses that several Modocs asserted to an 
unconvinced Captain Jack-" ••• the Commissioners intend to make peace 
with you by blowing your head off with one of them big guns. You mind 
what I tell you, Jack (the warrior speaking was Black Jim, ardently 
backed up by other Modoc braves) ~ Jll!..!I_ ~~£fill. .mu_ Jfil ~ start 
with them peacemakers is to kill them next-council: then all we can do 
is to fight until we die." Riddle also says that several warriors, 
particularly Black Jim and Hooker Jim ridiculed Jack when the chief 
appeared reluctant to murder the Commissioners, pushing him to the 
ground and calling him a "squaw, ff "fish-hearted woman" and other like 
insults. 114 Captain Jack evidently could not stand to be taunted in 
such a degrading manner, and agreed to kill Canby, although he thought 
it would eventually cost him his life. One reason for the Modoc 
treachery then, might have been a desire to delay action and inflict 
as much delay and sorrow on the American troops as possible before 
hostilities were recommenced. 
No Modocs who were in the lava-beds at this time left any records 
of what actually happened, thus Riddle's opinions, backed by the fact 
that he was Wi-Ne-Ma's son have to be accepted as the truth or approx~ 
imating the truth. 
General Canby and Doctor Thomas must share part of the guilt for 
114Riddle, Indian History., 71. 
the massacre because they consistently disregarded Wi-Ne-Ma's warnings 
that the Modocs intended treachery and that to attend any kind of a 
conference with tie "Renegades" would be very foolhardy. But, Canby and 
Thomas did attend the "peace" conference with unruly, dissatisfied, and 
desperate Indians sans the benefit of firearms or the protection of 
soldiers. The General and the Reverend evidently felt, respectively, 
that the possible worthwhile results of a peace conference justified 
"some risk", and that God would protect the Commission because of its 
benevolent intentions. The protests of the other Commissioners and the 
Riddles were overruled by Canby and Thomas, a decision that resulted in 
their death. 
Secretary of the Interior Delano certainly must take part of the 
blame for his orders to the Peace Commission to "continue negotiations" 
and effect an amicable truce, despite the fact that he was some 2,500 
miles removed from the scene of negotiations, and had received official 
reports from Commissioner Meacham that the Modocs were unstable and not 
to be trusted. Despite these reports Delano stated, ".! .f!s2. .ruu, believe 
.ili. Modocs intend treachery, ••• continue negotiations." Delano could 
scarcely have had any idea as to what the Modocs were thinking. 
A major share of the blame rests on the Modoc warriors, particularly 
Black Jim, Hooker Jim and Boston Charley who taunted and ridiculed their 
Chief into sanctioning the assassination. No matter how many injustices 
had been committed aqainst these Indians in the past, white law would 
never pardon such a flagrant violation of wartime honor. 
Looking Northwest from the Stronghold. An 
excellent example of terrain American soldiers 
had to cross to get at Jack's Stronghold. 
CHAPTER V CAPTURE 
At the same time Captain Jack's group was carrying out its plan to 
murder the Peace Commissioners, Curly Haired Jack and Curly Haired 
Doctor tried to lure Colonel Mason at the west end of the camp into a 
conference. Mason refused to meet with the Modocs, but a Major Boyle 
and Lieutenant W. L. Sherwood volunteered to talk to the Modocs. Obtain-
ing grudging consent from Colonel Mason, the two officers began to walk 
toward the Indians when Boyle noted guns concealed in the Modoe's clothing 
and shouted at Sherwood, "Run for your life!" However, before the 
officers could get away, Curly-haired Jack broke Sherwood's leg with a 
musket-ball. Troops, rushed to the scene immediately, managed to chase 
the Modocs back into their Stronghold.115 This attempt to murder high-
ranking officers of the army was also carried out under a flag of truce. 
Reaction to the Modoc actions on April 11, was fairly uniform, vary-
ing only in degree of bitterness. Major General J.M. Schofield, 
commanding the military division of the Pacific, wrote his superior 
officer, W. T. Sherman: "I have telegraphed Colonel Gillem116 to let 
115Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath., 505. 
116Gillem replaced Wheaton as commander in the lava beds. 
This niche, occupied by one Modoc warrior, shows 
the impregnable Western approach to the fortress. 
the punishment of the Modocs be severe as their treachery has merited 
and Li.I hope to hear soon that he has made an end of them. 11117 Sherman 
replied on April 13, 1873 that he had seen the President, who now 
sanctioned the most severe punishment for the Modocs. Sherman also hoped 
to hear soon that the Modocs had met the punishment they so richly 
deserved for their "insolence and perfidy. "ll8 
The feeling in the army camp at the lava beds was a combination of 
despair, sadness, and anger. Despair, because the last chance to avoid 
further loss of life was gone; sadness, because General Canby and Doctor 
Thomas were respected,men; and anger because the assassinations and 
attempted assassinations were carried out under a flag of truce. 
But once again, as was the ease after the January 18 battle, the 
Modocs were for the most part jubilant. Thinking that the soldiers would 
press an immediate attack the Modocs had reconciled their differences 
in order to present a strong, united front against the soldiers. When 
morning April 12 came and no soldiers, the Modoes felt they had won a 
great victory over the government; Schonchin said, They are afraid. They 
will grant us ••• all we ask? Captaln Jack took a more realistic stand, 
"The soldiers will come. Our victory is not complete. We must fight 
now until£ wi/ are all dead."119 There was little remorse in the 
Modoc camp over the assassinations, only the false hope that their actions 
would bring the United States to its knees. 120 Again, Captain Jack's 
117aouse Executive Documents., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 76. 
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prediction was to prove correct. 
Colonel Gillem spent April 12 and 13 settling on the plan he would 
use to punish the Modocs. The battle of January 17 had proved that a 
direct, frontal assault would cost many lives, thus Gillem ordered his 
troops to surround the Indians urging them to advance cautiously and 
make use of every possible cover. If this were accomplished the Modocs 
would not be able to escape and more important, their water supply would 
be cut off. 121 
Accordingly, on April 15, after the troops had moved into position 
during the night, the second attack began on the Modoc Stronghold. At 
1:30 p.m. following heavy fighting the soldiers had advanced several 
hundred yards into a strong position near the outcroppings of the more 
formidable center section of the lava beds. By nightfall, the army had 
strengthened their lines, and set up mortar batteries which shelled the 
Stronghold intermittently throughout the night. Army casualties were: 
One officer wounded, three enlisted men killed and nine wounded. The 
Modocs had no casualties.122 
Early on the morning of the 16th, the whole line advanced but the 
lava rocks and deadly Modoc sharpshooters made progress agonizingly slow. 
However, a junction was completed by the left of Major Green's command 
and the right of Colonel Mason's thus cutting off the Indian's water 
supply. By nightfall the persistent soldiers had almost reached the 
main caves of the Stronghold, so near in fact, that some troops retreated 
so as not to interfere with the shelling. The night of the 16th saw 
121House Executive Documents., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 80. 
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little lull in the fighting for the Modocs made several attempts to 
reach water, 123 even disguising a warrior as a squaw. However, none of 
the attempts succeeded and the Modocs faced two problems: how to get 
water; and how to get ammunition. 
But before the night battle began, the Modocs suffered their first 
dead of the war. Two young warriors had been abusing an unexploded 
mortar shell till one hit it with an ax. The shell exploded, scattering 
parts of the warriors• bodies-over the adjacent area. 124 Saddened by 
the death of the two warriors, and realizing their hopeless situation, 
Scarface Charley admitted in a night council on the 17th, "I have given 
up hope of standing these soldiers off. We cannot do it ••• I do not like 
to run but I think it's the best thing for us to do ••• let's go out of 
here tonight. I think we can do so without much trouble."125 All the 
Modocs agreed, and on April 16, all but two old women and one man made 
their escape to the South. 
When the soldiers renewed their attack on the 17th, they met no 
resistance and the troops finally took possession of the "celebrated 
Stronghold."126 
The following day Warm Springs Scouts127 reconnoitered the area to 
the South but could report nothing except that the Modocs had not left 
123Ibid. 
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the lava beds proper. Two days passed with the army inactive, until the 
Warm Springs' discovered the Modocs in a new position four miles due 
South of their old Stronghold. 
Colonel Gillem immediately wrote to the Assistant Adjutant General, 
Military Division of the Pacific that "-Arrangements will be made as 
rapidly as possible to attack, and if possible, surround them."128 
After a week's preparation, six commissioned officers, sixty-four 
foot soldiers, and fourteen Warm Springs' scouts, all under Captain 
Evan Thomas' command, left the west camp at 7 a.m. to make a "reconaissance 
in a Southeasterly direction to a point about four miles from camp."129 
The object of the reconaissance was to find out if a pack train and 
mortar battery could be taken through the lava beds. By noon the 
detachment reached the four mile limit, and having encountered no sign 
of a Modoc, they sat down, stacked their rifles and began lunch. 130 
At this moment the Modocs were 800 yaxd.s away holding a hurried 
consultation as to details of the attack. A Lieutenant Wright began to 
feel apprehensive and quoted an ago-old maxim, "When you don't see Indians 
is just the time to be on the look out for them."131 Disregarding this 
advice Captain Thomas called in all his pickets for lunch, placing the 
entire command at the bottom of a small ravine. 
Just as the signal-sergeant was preparing to send a message to the 
main camp, the Modocs opened fire with unerring accuracy. The official 
128iiouse Executive Documents., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 82. 
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report then says: "The officers, though surprised, immediately sprang 
up and prepared for action. A well-directed fire ••• from the Indians 
caused a large numbei;, probably two-thirds, of the enlisted men to break, 
and run away in the most cowardly manner. The officers, thus deserted 
by their men, rallied the few brave spirits--mostly non-commissioned 
officers--and fought the foe with undaunted courage. They and the brave 
men who stood by them were all found killed and wounded where they so 
nobly but ineffectually fought. "132 
Of the original detachment of 70 soldiers resting in the ravine, 
23 managed to reach headquarters at the lava beds. 133 
Having taken the food, arms, and ammunition from the soldiers, 
Captain Jack led the Modocs Southeast. and on May 7 captured a train of 
four wagons and fifteen animals near Supply Camp on the East side of 
Tulelake. In this engagement "fifteen or twenty" Modocs "whipped11 the 
train's army escort of about the same number, the Modocs suffering no 
casualties, while the Army had three wounded. 134 
On May 8, two companies of soldiers accompanied by Warm Springs 
Scouts left the lava beds headquarters to try and catch the slippery 
Modocs, and also to prevent them from "murdering any settlers in their 
probable retreat.n135 Captain Jack appeared on the morning of the 10th, 
and "although Lthe troop.§/ were not fully prepared for the 5ttac)s/, 
132aouse Executive Documents., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 83. 
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Lt,hei/ at once sprang to arms and returned the fire. "136 According to 
General Jefferson Davis' report, 137 the Modocs then broke and fought a 
rear-guard action for three miles, until they disappeared into the lava 
beds again. This Dry Lake (see map) battle is significant for three 
reasons. First, it gave the Army a victory, thereby boosting the sagging 
morale. Second, although both sides did not know it, Dry Lake was the 
last pitched battle of the Modoc War. Third, Ellen's Man, a Modoc sub-
chief was killed at Dry Lake. His death brought into the open simmering 
quarrels among the Modocs and led directly to the end of the war. 
Ellen's Man was popular in the Modoc tribe, and after his death 
several Modocs irritably accused Captain Jack of causing his death. They 
said Jack was guilty of placing outside138 Indians in the front lines, 
thus directly contributing to their death. 
After quarreling all night, the Modocs began to take sides for a 
fight in the morning, only a few standing by Captain Jack. The Modoc 
Chief spoke to Black Jim, "You accuse me wrong, but if you people think 
I killed Ellen's Man or caused his death, you know what to do. Shoot 
me ••• I just as leave die fighting my own men as to die fighting soldiers. 
I know we will all be killed anyway in battle, or I know I shall be hung 
if I am captured ••• You men are the very men that drove me to kill 
General Canby and now you want to blame me for Ellen's Man's death ••• ?"139 
Black Jim replied, heatedly, "I will stop your talk, you coward?," 
and only a hasty intervention by another Modoc, William, saved Jack. 
136.!lug,. 
137navis replaced Gillem as co.mmander. 
138Pit River Indians of which Ellen's Man was a member. 
139Riddle, Indian History., 123. 
fil. 
Black Jim wheeled on William saying, "I quit my chief today." Captain 
Jack, his family, Schonchin John, four other families, and four or five 
men followed Jack as he started walking east. Black Jim, Bogus Charley, 
Boston Charley, Hooker Jim and the rest went in the opposite direction. 
While the death of Ellen's Man was the outward reason for the break, 
there was another broader and more important cause. General Davis hints 
at it in his official report: "The chief could no longer keep his 
warriors up to the work required of them, lying on their arms night and 
day, and watching for an attack. These exactions were so great, and the 
conduct of the leader so tyrannical, that insubordination spr~ng up, which 
led to dissensions and the final separation of the band into two parties ••• "140 
In other words, despite the fact that the Modocs had defeated detachments 
of the United States Army on January 17, April 15-17, April 26 and May 10, 
the pressure was too great for the Modocs to stand; they lost their unity 
and thus their only chance either to defeat the army or evade them. 
Captain Jack's prediction that the soldiers would never give up had been 
realized, and it had brought the disintegration of the Modocs. 
Black Jim's group camped near Willow Creek, California, on the South 
slope of Van Bremer 1 r. Mountain. At mid-afternoon on May 12, Warm Springs' 
scouts got to within 2QO yards of Black Jim's camp and called up the 
soldiers. In the brief engagement that followed the Modoes beat off the 
soldiers and the Warm Springs', and escaped to Fairchild's mountain 
about four miles from the Southwest tip of Klamath Lake, California. 141 
140Meacham, Wigwam and Warpath., 579. 
141Riddle, Indian History., 126. 
A Modoc trench indicating the type of cover the 
Indians utilized. 
While concealed on Fairchild's Mountain, scouting parties of Warm 
Springs began to come closer and closer to the Modoc camp. Finally, 
Bogus Charley, Hooker Jim, Shacknasty Jim and Scarface Charley came into 
Fairchild's Ranch on May 22. Scarface Charley announced, "Hello, mans, 
me come here with this my mans, me like no more fight; me like quit, me 
much tired; no sleep long time now ••• You soldiers, many, many; pore me; 
'spose you fight me and one man, me lick you puty damned quick, you 
bet. 11142 The following day, the rest of Black Jim's Modocs surrendered. 
Also, on May 23, Bogus, Hooker, Boston and Scarface were hired as 
scouts at 100 dollars per month, plus horses, guns, and uniforms to 
track down Captain Jack, who, in the meantime had led his few followers 
between Clear Lake and Tule Lake into Langell's Valley. (See frontispiece.) 143 
After three days of hunting the scouts found Captain Jack camped 
on Willow Creek, fourteen miles from Applegate's ranch. According to 
Davis' dispatch, "The scouts reported a stormy interview with their 
chief. He denounced them in severe terms for leaving him; he intended 
to die with his gun in his hand; they were squaws, not men. He intended 
to jump Applegate 1s ranch that night (the 28th)."144 
Davis immediately ordered Captains H. C. Hosbrauck's and James 
Jackson's commands to rendezvous at Applegate 1 s ranch. At nine a.m., 
May 29, the troops report_ed, and were in an exultant mood for "the 
impenetrable rocky region was behind them; the desperado and his band 
were ahead of them, in comparatively an open country."145 After resting 
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the horses for an hour, the soldiers renewed the pursuit. At one p.m., 
on May 29, they jumped Jack's camp, but the Indian slipped away. After 
two days of a chase Davis describes as "more of a chase after wild beasts 
than war"146 the soldiers caught up again with Jack. This time there 
was no escape because he stood on a ledge in front of a cave. 
When the troops approached and took his gun, he was a ragged, dirty, 
and beaten Indian. 
He said, "Jack's legs give out."147 
On June 3, General W. T. Sherman telegraphed the Commander of the 
Military Division of the Pacific, J.M. Schofield, that the Modocs were 
to be held in protective custody until President Grant should decide on 
their final disposition. 148 Sherman's order halted General Davis' plan 
to execute eight or ten Modocs on the spot. Davis reported on June 5: 
"I have no doubt of the propriety and necessity of executing them on the 
spot at once. I had no doubt of my authority, as department connnander 
in the field, to thus execute a band of robbers, outlaws, and murderers 
like these. Your dispatch indicates a long delay ••• which I regret. 
Delay will destroy the moral effect which their prompt execution would 
have upon other tribes, as also, the inspiring effect upon the troops."149 
Davis also said the four "traitorous" scoutsl50 had won the admiration 
of all for their aid in capturing Captain Jack. Althoug~ Davis recommended 
146Ibid. 
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these four be exempted from the death penalty, he did this realizing 
"Hooker Jim and ff,carface Charle.I? have been among the worst of the 
band."151 
Meanwhile, President Grant asked Attorney General of the United 
States, George H. Williams for an opinion as to whether the Modoc 
prisoners could be tried by a military tribunal. Not possessing a close 
knowledge of the Modoc difficulties, Williams did not present a detailed 
opinion; yet in his reply dated June 7, Williams made the case against 
the Modocs quite convincing without actually calling them guilty of 
murder. 
Referring to the April 11 assassination, Williams wrote, "According 
to the laws of war, there is nothing more sacred than a flag of truce 
dispatched in good faith, and there can be no greater act of perfidy 
and treachery than the assassination of its bearers after they have been 
acknowledged and received by those to whom they are sent. 11152 Williams 
then mentioned that no statute of the United States makes this a crime 
and thus it is not punishable under the Rules and Articles of War and 
if punishable at all, it had to be through a power derived from the 
usages of war. 153 He cited Attorney General Speed'sl54 opinion that 
bushwhackers, jayhawkers, bandits, assassins, etc ••• may be tried, con-
demned, and executed as offenders against the laws of war as understood 
and practiced by the civilized nations of the world. 




Continuing, Williams states that while the laws and customs of 
civilized war may not be applicable to Indian tribes, still the circum-
stances of the ''Canby Massacre" make their murder as much a violation 
of the laws of savage as of civilized warfare, and that the Modocs 
fully understood the baseness and treachery of their act. 
In his concluding paragraphs Williams writes that relations of 
Indian tribes to the United States are often difficult to define, but 
since "they have been recognized as independent communities for treaty-
making purposes, and as they frequently carry on organized and protracted 
wars, they may properly, it seems to me, be held subject to those rules 
of warfare ••• which make perfidy like that in question punishable by 
military authority."155 
Accordingly, Secretary of War, William Belknap wrote to General 
Schofield in San Francisco, "I am instructed ••• to direct you ••• to have 
the Modoc prisoners tried by military commission ••• •t.156 
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On July 1, 1873 at 10 a.m. the Military Commission that would try 
the Modoc prisoners met at Fort Klamath pursuant to the order of General 
Jef. C. Davis commanding the military Department of the Columbia. 
Lieutenant Colonel W. L. Elliot was President of the Commission with 
Major H.P. Curtis as the Judge Advocate; other Commissioners were 
Captains John Mendenhall, Henry Hasbrouck, Robert Pollock, and Second 
Lieutenant George Kingsbury. 
After a delay of four days while Judge Advocate Curtis prepared 
his case, the Commission reconvened and went through the usual pre-
trial formalities. The Modocs on trial1 including Captain Jack, 
Schonchin John, Boston Charley, Black Jim, Banncho, and Slolux, having 
agreed to the Riddles as interpreters, listened impassively to the list 
of crimes they were charged with. The Modocs on trial were those who 
actively participated in the Canby Massacre. Hooker Jim and Scarface 
Charley, who were reputedly very bad Indians, were free to do as they 
pleased presumably because they had aided the United States in capturing 
*All quoted material in this chapter is found in the official transcript 
of the trial. HoUS@ Executive Documents., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 131-
203. 
Jack. 
Before examining the actual questioning process an important para-
graph in the transcript should be noted. "The prisoners were then 
severally asked by the Judge-Advocate if they desired to introduce 
counsel; to which they severally replied in the negative; and that they 
had been unable to procure any." This statement would later be the bas is 
for severe recriminations directed at the United States Government. 
T. F. Riddle, a witness for the prosecution, was the first to be 
questioned. In the initial twelve questions the Judge Advocate 
established that Riddle had been at the council tent April 11 and could 
identify the Modocs on trial. Curtis then asked Riddle if he had been 
present at the killing of General Canby to which Riddle replied a 
definite, "Yes, sir." Curtis followed with a series of questions 
indicating that Riddle bad known the Modocs intended treachery at the 
council, and had appropriately warned the CoBlllissioners. In the course 
of the questioning, Riddle stated the terms for the April 11 conference 
were that five, unarmed Indians would meet the Commissioners but actually 
there were eight armed Modocs in attendance. After this evidence had 
been presented, Curtis steered Riddle through an account of the pre-
ceedings at the council tent ApriL 11th. He asked Riddle, "Did you 
perceive as soon as you got there that these men were armed?" Riddle 
answered, ,.Yes, sir, I did." 
Curtis then wanted to know if captain Jack represented the Modocs 
at this council, and Riddle said, "Yes, sir." Then in the key questions 
of Riddle's testimony, the Judge Advocate asked, "You say Captain Jack 
got up and went to the rear, and you saw him put his hand to his'breast?" 
Riddle replied, "Yes, sir," and then the Judge Advocate asked, "What 
then occurred?" Riddle answered that he came back, stepped in front 
of General Canby, said in the Modoc tongue, "All ready, Boys!" and " 
"before you could crack your finger, he fired." 
The next questions were concerned with Riddle's account of what 
happened after Captain Jack fired at General Canby. In this exchange 
Riddle admitted he saw no other Indians fire on the Commissioners 
because he thought it was "warm times there" and had run away. Riddle 
did say he saw the bodies of Canby and Thomas, who were dead, and Meacham, 
who was badly wounded, after they had been brought back to Army Head-
quarters. 
In the final few questions Curtis brought out testimony that must 
have weighed heavily against the ·Modocs. He asked Riddle, "Was anything 
done by the commissioners, on any one or more of them, to give occasion 
for this attack upon them at the hands of the Indians?" Riddle 
answered, "No, sir; not that I know of." <Question, "Did you see anything?" 
Answer, "I saw nothing." Judge Curtis then assumed, "So far as you saw, 
then, it was without justification?" and Riddle agreed, "Yes, sir; it 
was without justification." 
Riddle's clear and occasionally colorful testimony said, in effect, 
that the Modocs committed calculated murder without any sort of pro-
vocation. However, his answers were not complete because he had not 
remained on the scene at the Massacre and thus had seen only Captain 
Jack and Schonchin John fire shots. But the next witness, Riddle's 
wife Wi-Ne-Ma, supplied the missing details. 
Through Wi-Ne-Ma, Curtis immediately confirmed Riddle's testimony 
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that the accused Indians had all been present at the Massacre. Curtis 
then asked the Indian woman questions that would fill the gaps in 
Riddle's testimony. He wanted to know if Wi-Ne-Ma had seen particular 
Indians fire on the commissioners. Seldom using more than a "yes", or 
a "Yes, sir t'' Wi-Ne-Ma testified she had seen Schonchin fire at Meacham, 
Boston Charley at Dr. Thomas, Hooker Jim at Dyer and Captain Jack at 
General Canby. She also testified, in a series of questions, that she 
knew the Massacre was pre-arranged because a Modoc named William had 
warned her several days J>efore. 
Wi-Ne-Ma's lucid testimony was so curt and pat that it almost 
seemed rehearsed. At no time in her answers did she use more than one 
sentence, and all her answers were thoughtful and to the point, re-
inforcing what her husband had said and adding information that her 
husband was unable to supply. 
L. S. Dyar, still Indian Agent at the Klamath Agency was the next 
witness for the prosecution, and proved to be the worst one. Curtis' 
preliminary questioning was devoted to finding out if Dyar had been 
legally appointed to the Peace Commission by the correct authority. 
Dyar replied that his authority had been a telegram from Oregon Super-
intendent of Indian Affairs Odeneal. Satisfied, Curtis took Dyar 
through a resume of incidents leading up to April 11. Finally, Curtis 
asked if Dyar had seen Captain Jack fire his revolver at Canby. Dyar 
replied, "iJI saw he was aiming his pistol at General Canby; I think he 
was ••• " Dyar continued, under questioning, that he saw no more because 
he had started running and was about 150 yards away before he even 
turned around. But the Indian Agent was of some value to the prosecution 
for he stated that he had no doubt Hooker Jim's intention was to kill 
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him. Hooker was the Modoc who bad followed Dyar away from the site of 
the Massacre. 
For some reason Dyar's testimony was evasive, full of inconclusive 
statements beginning "I think11 or "I believe." Dyar was undoubtedly 
the poorest witness the prosecution examined. He was also the last 
witness of the day. 
The Commission re-convened on July 7 at 7 a.m., and Curtis began 
to question various Modocs about the Massacre. The first was Shacknasty 
Jim. Shacknasty's testimony added little except to corroborate previous 
statements as to what Indians had attended the April 11 conference. The 
Modoc could not tell who had been responsible for planning the Massacre. 
Steamboat Frank, the next Modoc witness had more to offer. In 
reply to a question about who proposed the Massacre, Steamboat answered, 
"Captain Jack." In addition, Steamboat testified that he had gone to 
a position near the fatal council tent only because "t:aptain Jack told 
me to come there." 
At this point in the trial, L. S. Dyar was called back to the stand 
to correct a trivial flaw in his testimony. 
Bogus Charley followed Dyar to the stand and in a brief examination 
by Curtis admitted that he did not know Canby's group were to be murdered 
only that he had heard Captain Jack and Schonchin John "talk about it 
a little." 
Curtis' purpose in questioning these four Indians was obviously to 
establish that Captain Jack was the leader and originator of the scheme 
to murder the Peace Commission, and on the basis of the transcript the 
evidence is conclusive that Captain Jack was the moving force in the 
Massacre. Yet an analysis of the testimony in the light of other 
ll. 
factors easts doubt on the validity of the testimony. 
Jeff Riddle and A. B. Meacham in their sections on the Canby 
Massacre contend that Captain Jack was quite reluctant in giving his 
consent to the murder of the Commissioners. Riddle and Meacham assert 
that it was actually the younger warriors of the tribe who pressed the 
issue in a violent debate about a week before April 11. Yet in their 
testimony, Shacknasty Jim, Steamboat Frank, Hooker Jim and Bogus Charley 
who were all important members of the Modoc tribe, insist that Captain 
Jack did not even discuss the matter with them and it came to their 
knowledge only through hearsay. It seems strange that a chief would not 
discuss such an important decision with his lieutenants, and it seems 
even stranger in view of the fact that Hooker Jim was the most fanatic 
of the Modocs when it came to killing defenceless persons. 
But Curtis took absolutely no notice of these points, and contented 
himself with testimony that plans for the Massacre were being made by 
Captain Jack and Schonchin John about a week before April 11. 
Captain Jack, however, declined to cross-examine the witnesses 
thus missing a fine opportunity to take some of the blame for premeditation 
off his shoulders, and thereby receive a lighter sentence. Had the Modoc 
Chief been given a capable and unbiased lawyer, the trial might conceiv-
ably have taken a different course at this moment with the finger of 
guilt being pointed at the uneasy Modoc defectors. 
But the chance passed, and A. B. Meacham wascalled to the witness 
stand. Meacham was questioned closely by the Judge Advocate and his 
eye-witness testimony was the prosecution's clinching argument. 
After telling of the circumstances leading up to April 11, Meacham 
got in his most conclusive testimony in the last twenty-one questions. 
Meacham said Captain Jack was within three feet of General Canby when 
he shot him and that there had been no angry words, nothing, done by the 
commissioners that justified the attack. Even though he had been 
severely wounded, the former Indian Agent was able to testify that he 
had seen Indians running after Dyar and Riddle in an attempt to kill 
them. Curtis then asked four questions that put the Modocs in a very 
bad light. \Question: "Do you have any doubt that the Indians intended 
to kill and murder you?" Answer: "None." {Question: "Had General 
Canby a weapon on his person?" Answer: "Not that I am aware of." 
(Question: "Had Doctor Thomas?" Answer: "I know he had not." 
!Question: "Were there any weapons in the party which could have been 
seen by the Indians?" Answer: "I think not." 
The commission then adjourned till 9:30 a.m., July 8th when 
Lieutenant H. R. Anderson of the Fourth Artillery, and personal aide to 
General Canby, was called to the stand. Anderson was used to establish 
whether there were hostilities of any kind going on during the period 
of the peace negotiations. Curtis asked the Lieutenant if, at the time 
Canby was killed, there were any military operations going on, to which 
Anderson answered, "None whatever." A little later Curtis repeated his 
question, "At the time of General Canby's death, I think you said, a 
suspension of arms and hostilities were existing?" Anderson said, 
"Yes, sir." 
Henry McEldery, Assistant Surgeon of the United States Army, was 
the last witness called by the prosecution. Under questioning, McEldery 
testified that he saw General Canby on the field April 11, quite dead, 
and "stripped of every article of clothing. He had three wounds on his 
body, and several abrasions of the face. One of the wounds, apparently 
made by the ball was about at the innercanthus of the left eye ••• tt 
McEldery continued that the cause of death was a ball which entered the 
eye, came up into the head and through the brain. McEldery then testified 
that he had examined Dr~ Thomas and concluded that the Doctor died of a 
gunshot wound in the heart. The surgeon closed his testimony, saying 
that both men met their death on April 11. 
In two and one-half days Judge Advocate Curtis proveq through his 
witnesses, that the April 11 Massacre was premeditated and that the 
accused Indians were guilty of murder and/or attempted murder while under 
a flag of truce. The only thing remaining in the trial was the defense 
testimony of Captain Jack. 
Jack's uneducated attempt to save himself and his comrades was, 
to say the least, pathetic. 
Scar-faced Charley was the first witness to testify for the defense. 
Captain Jack's first question to his former lieutenant was, "Tell about 
Link-River Jack coming and giving us powder and stuff." Scarface said 
that the first time Link-River Jack had come was down at the east end 
of the lava beds when the Modocs were being attacked by soldiers and 
that Link River told the Modocs not to shoot at the Klamath Indians. 
Captain Jack's next question was "When was this?" Scarface did not answer 
this question but went into a lengthy description of the relations 
between the Klamaths and the Modocs during the war. He implied that 
some of the Klamaths were not loyal to the United States O..ink-River 
Jack) and were cowards to boot. 
These were the only two questions Captain Jack asked Scarface. 
The commission then took over the questioning and found that Scarface 
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had seen Captain Jack and the other Modocs firing on the Peace Conuniss-
ion April 11. 
What Captain Jack had in mind to accomplish with these questions 
is unknown. Certainly they offered no refutation of the charges leveled 
against Jack. Possibly the Modoc Chief was attempting to blame the 
Klamaths for their part in instigating the war. 
The following defense witnesses seem to bear out this theory. Dave, 
a low-ranking Modoc was asked, "What do you know about Lalake and what 
he done?" It turned out Lalake was a Klamath sub-chief and had been 
sent by the Klamath Chief, Allen David, to tell the Modocs "not to give 
up to the soldiers--not to make peace." Dave closed his testimony say-
ing Lalake had told him, "The Klamaths are your friends and have given 
you ammunition and will give it to you whenever you want it." 
Assuming Dave's testimony was true, which is doubtful in view of 
the bad feeling between the two tribes, it- still accomplished nothing 
in the way of absolving Captain Jack and the other accused of the guilt 
for the Canby Massacre; nor did One-eyed Mose, Captain Jack's final 
witness, who was told to "Tell about Link-River Jack." 
Judge Advocate Curtis then asked the other accused Modocs if they 
had any witnesses to sunnnon. Each of them said no, and Captain Jack 
was then given an opportunity to address the trial commission. 
Portions of this long speech are worth quoting for it was Captain 
Jack's last-ditch effort to save himself: "No white man can say that 
I ever objected to their coming to live in my country; I have always 
dealt honest and upright with every man ••• I would like to see the man 
who started this fuss, and caused me to be in the trouble I am in now. 
"I have always lived on what I could kill and shoot with my gun and 
catch in my trap. Riddle knows that I have always lived like a man, and 
have never gone beggingi that what I have got I always got with my own 
hands honestly ••• ! hardly know how to talk here. I don't know how white 
people talk in such a place as this; but I will do the best I can." 
The Judge Advocate: "Talk exactly as if you were at home in a 
council." 
Jack, (continuing): "I didn't know anything about the war--when 
it was going to. Major Jackson came down there and commenced on me while 
I was in bed asleep ••• When Major Jackson came and got there just at day-
light and made me jump out of my bed without a shirt or anything else ••• 
and I hollered to Major Jackson for them not to shoot, that I would talk 
••• Major Jackson shot my men while they were standing around. 
"I had never told Hooker Jim and his party to murder any settlers 
and I did not want them to stay with me ••• <To Hooker Jim) What did you 
kill those people for? I never wanted you to kill my friends. You have 
done it on your own responsibility. 
PWhile the peace talk was going on there was a squaw came from 
Fairchild's and Dorris' and told us that the peace commissioners were 
going to murder us ••• There was an old Indian man came in the night and 
told me that Nate Beswick told him that that day Meacham, General Canby, 
Dr. Thomas, and Dyar were going to murder us if we came at the council 
••• then there was another squaw came from Fairchild's and told me that 
Meacham and the peace commissioners had a pile of wood ready built up 
and were going to burn me on this pile of wood. 
"I never commenced the fight. Hooker Jim is the one that always 
wanted to fight and commenced killing and murdering. When I would get 
to talking they would tell me to hush! I and Hooker Jim had a fuss ••• 
and I wanted to kill him for he is the one that murdered the settlers 
on Tulelake. 
"Hooker Jim said, 'You are like an old squawj you have never done 
any fighting ••• You are not fit to be chief?' I told him I was not ashamed 
of it; that I knew I had not killed anybody, and that I did not want 
to kill anybody, and I would have felt sorry if I had killed anybody." 
The trial then adjourned, resuming on the fifth day, July 9, 1873, 
when Captain Jack made his last statement: "I told them that I did not 
want to have any trouble with the peace commissioners; that I did not 
want to kill them. Hooker Jim he said that he wanted to kill Meacham, 
and we must do it. That is all I have got to say. tt 
Captain Jack's speech went to naught, for on the same day, July 9, 
the trial commission returned a verdict of guilty on all charges for 
all the accused Modocs. 
Judge Advocate General, J. Holt, confirmed the verdict and wrote 
to President U.S. Grant on August 12, 1873, "It is the conclusion ••• of 
this bureau that a full and just trial has been had; and as all the 
accused are shown ••• to have participated in the murders charged, no 
doubt is entertained that the finding in the case of each one is entirely 
warranted by the testimony. 
"And the punishmen-t adjudged by them for the treacherous and 
dastardly assassination of unarmed men, engaged in the peaceful discharge 
of high public duty ••• was certainly the only one which justice and the 
usage of civilized war would regard as adequate." 
On August 23, President Grant approved the sentences, and on 
September 10, Grant commuted the sentences of Barncho and Slolux to 
J.1 
life imprisonment on Alcatraz Island. 
Mid-morning, October 3 , saw the bodies of Captain Jack, Schon chin 
John, Black Jim, and Boston Charley swinging from the pine trees in a 
grove just outside of Fort Klamath. They were buried in this same grove. 
There is no doubt that the United States government proved the four 
Modoes guilty of murder and attempted murder while under a flag of truce. 
Rules of civilized warfare gave the United States the opportunity to try 
these Indians, even though the Modocs had never heard of the rules of 
the game, so to speak. 
But the trial was not a fair one. 
By what right could the United States judge and aonvict other human 
beings who had not had the benefit of trial counsel? Especially when 
the accused were Indians, completely ignorant of the processes of 
American law. 
Despite the fact that Captain Jack and his cohorts were guilty of 
the charged crimes, there were extenuating circumstances that might have 
given the Modocs commuted sentences, had the Indians had a competent 
lawyer. 
For example, Hooker Jim and other young firebrands apparently were 
guilty of pushing and goading Captain Jack into the Massacre. Also, 
consider the fact that Hooker Jim led a group of Modocs in a brutal 
raid on November 29, 1872 that resulted in the death of many white 
settlers. Yet Hooker Jim and his band were never tried for any crime. 
And what of the point that the United States Government through 
its Indian Agent, o. C. Knapp, had been partially responsible for the 
war beginning. It seems strange that a government could execute a 
death sentence on Indians for crimes that the government was partially 
responsible for. 
In the broader sense, the advance of American civilization with its 
fences and plows almost forced the Indian to fight back--if not for 
their homes, then at least for their honor. 
But the United States did not consider these points and the Indians 
died. 
In view of the extenuating circumstances would not a verdict of 
life imprisonment have been more logical and just? 
CHAPTER V.11 AmRMI\TH AND COllCLIJSIONS 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to deal with public opinion 
regarding the Modoc War. The objective has been to present an accurate 
and unbiased account Qf the Modoc War157 with personal opinions inter-
spersed at appropriate points. 
Most Americans accepted the death sentence levied on the four 
Modocs and the removal of the remainder to the (Quapaw Reservation, 
Indian Territory, Nebraska, with approvai. 158 But there were factions 
and individuals with idealistic and admirable, if impractical, theories 
who protested the final decisions in the Modoc matter. 
On June 8, 1873, Mrs. Mary Benham of Fort Ross, California wrote 
an indignant letter to Interior Secretary Delano. Speaking as an 
authority on military tactics 9 Mrs. Benham wrote, "General Canby and 
Dr. Thomas disregarded three warnings. They walked to their fate. It 
was ~ad, very sad, but General Canby was an old army officer. He knew 
that war is an art, a science, and that in time of war, all stratagems 
are legitimate ••• 11159 She says, then, that the Modocs were justified 
157This has never been fully accomplished. 
158uouse Executive Documents., 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 329. 
1591bid., 290-291. 
in perpetrating the Canby Massacre while under a flag of truce. This 
theory is difficult to subscribe to. The Modocs were not aborigines 
completely cut off from the mores of white civilization; by Captain 
Jack's own admission, the Indians had lived near white settlements and 
had even been eager to embrace the ways of the white man. It seems 
feasible that the Modocs were aware of the white conception of the flag 
of truce, and possibly even aware of the consequences of violating the 
truce. Therefore, it is impossible to excuse the Modocs from their 
guilt because of ignorance, or because "anything is fair in love and 
war." Consider this proposition that "anything is fair in love and war." 
That implies that the agreed upon cessation of hostilities in the Modoc 
War need not have been observed. Now the intangible word, honor, enters 
the picture; the United States represented by the peace commissioners 
approached the April 11 conference with no intention of violating terms 
of the truce; the Modocs did not. 
In essence, the Modocs tricked the United States and committed 
murder in violation of a section of the common law of the American 
military. A white person would be prosecuted for such trickery; iS 
it not logical then that the Modocs should be punished for their actions, 
especially in view of the fact that there were no hostilities going on 
anywhere in the whole region. 
The question could be asked, "But did the white laws mean anything 
to the Modocs." In this case the answer is yes, and thus the United 
States was justified in prosecuting the Modocs. 
Alfred Love and his Universal Peace Union, an organization whose 
title denotes its purpose made many mild protestations that President 
Grant extend clemency to the Modocs who were on trial. On March 18, 1873, 
fil 
Love wrote to Delano, "To us the solution of the matter seems so plain 
and simple that perhaps we forget the distance we are removed from the· 
Indians and the meager reports we have; but we see there has been a want 
of confidence, and that want of confidence has engendered fear on each 
side ••• the peace question must be carried forward without fear and with-
out dependence on carnal weapons ••• Let these Modocs know that the 
military is not to interfere; that there true friends are there to meet 
them, and let those friends be friends in spirit and in truth and their 
lives will not be in danger, and the peace of our country and the judg-
ment of your administration in this particular will be secured."160 
Love's statement is important in three respects. He reflected the 
attitudes of the (Quakers, and other groups dedicated to promoting peace 
and good-will among racial entities; it indicates that most of the 
American nation was not aware of the realities in the lava beds; and it 
hit on a basic point--the fear which was prevalent on both sides. Fear 
was the cause of the Modoc War. The Modocs feared the army and life on 
the reservation; the whites feared the casualties that would come before 
the elusive Indians could be caught and, whether they realized it or 
not, the very prospect of an Indian outbreak was enough to stop any 
serious or prolonged peace negotiations and call on the military. 
Because of this unreasoning fear, neither side would trust the other. 
War became the easy alternative. 
Love renewed with vigor his plea for clemency when he wrote on 
August 18, 1873, "It is ••• evident that in the trial at Fort Klamath 
ending about the 9th of July, the original and real causes of the war, 
160Ibid., 278-279. 
and the death of Canby and Thomas, were entirely ignored, in obedience 
to public opinion in that region, showing that an impartial jury trial 
could not be had."161 In the same letter, Love quotes Thomas Cree, 
Secretary of the Board of Indian Connnissioners as his source of infor-
mation. Cree's statement said "that only sixty out of three hundred and 
eighteen Modocs ever assented to the treaty of 1864i that the balance 
with Captain Jack, refused to go on the reservation under that treaty; 
that, in 1869, Captain Jack and his band were persuaded to go on certain 
conditions, but which were most shamefully broken by the agents; and after 
suffering on the cold barren mountains and being compelled to return to 
their home; that the Modocs were not thievish or mischievous, and gave 
no trouble to the white people so long as they were allowed to remain 
in peace."162 Cree's statement contains some false information--Captain 
Jack signed the 1864 treaty and went immediately on the reservation, 
agreeing to abide by the terms of the treaty; evidence cited earlier in 
the thesis proves that Captain Jack's Modocs were "thievish and ~is-
' 
chievousi" nor does Cree mention A. B. Meacham's wise and conciliatory 
efforts to get the Modocs back on the reservation. 
But in essence, Cree's opinions are quite correct. The activities 
on the Klamath Indian Reservation during the years 1864 to 1872 could 
not be endured by the Modocs. Thieving of the Klamath Indians and the 
insulting, inactive manner of Indian Agent Knapp forced the Modocs to 
leave the reservation and rebuff any attempts to effect their return. 
161 lWJ!., 319-321. 
162Ibid. 
The United States government, through its failure to control its agents 
and wards, was at least equally responsible for the outbreak of war. 
Because of this reason the United States government would have done 
well to connnute the death sentences to life imprisonment. Another point 
that favors a life imprisonment sentence was brought out by Captain 
Jack's trial testimony and other fairly reliable evidence--namely that 
Hooker Jim, Black Jim and other young Modocs were the most villainous 
members of the tribe and actually insisted that Captain Jack connnitt 
murder or relinquish his leadership in dishonor. 
The American Indian Aid Association in an article in the New York 
Star, July 23, 1873 re-inforced the arguments of the Universal Peace 
Union and other parties interested in the salvation of the Modocs, claim-
ing that any execution by virtue of a trial in which the original causes 
of the war, and the death of Canby and Thomas should be denounced as 
murder. But more interesting were the implications that the ignorant 
and defenseless Modocs were unlucky victims of American Manifest Destiny; 
also, that basically, the Indian cul tu res~ were hygenically, dietetically, 
morally, and religiously superior to their white counterparts. 163 
In the case of the Modocs, these implications or allegations are 
ridiculous. Most of the Modocs were neither ignorant nor defenseless; 
rather they were intelligent and relentless opponents, whose personal 
habits are not comparable to white habits because the standards are quite 
different. 
Yet all of the persons who appealed for clemency for the Modocs, 
assumed that Indians per se could not possible be quilty of any crime. 
The Eastern section of the nation, from which most of these arguments 
163 3 7 '.lbJ.jl. , 1 -318. 
c_ame, evidently conceived of the Modocs as tall, handsome warriors 
with feathered warbonnets trailing to the ground and victims of persecution 
and ill-treatment from the United States. 
The Modocs were actually unkempt, dirty, "theivish," ruthless and 
just as much to blame for the war as the United States. America was 
wrong in executing the Modocs, but on the other hand, the Modocs were 
wrong in executing Canby and Thomas. 
In fact; the whole Modoc episode was the fault of both sides--both 
sides must share the blame, not just the United States as has been the 
prevalent opinion. 
If a definite assessment of guilt be demanded, this author would 
recall a basic argument for clemency to the Modocs--"All 's fair in 
love and war;" and counter it with a Biblical quotation--"An eye for 
an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." 
EPILOGUE 
Today, ironically enough, the Modocs are back on the Klamath 
Indian Reservation; and the enmity between the Klamaths and the Modocs 
still exists, although it is now a repressed and sullen feeling. 
However, the Modoc lot in 1954 is much better than it was 85 years 
ago. Stability and security in the form of farming, cattle, stores, 
and clapboard houses have replaced the uncertain existence of Captain 
Jack's band. There is no threat of starvation or freezing now. 
Despite these advantages of agency life, the Modocs are still not 
content; for, in addition to directing their way of life, the white 
population is snobbish and distrustful. This makes the Modoc situation, 
particularly in Klamath Falls, a touchy one--so touchy that many of the 
1954 Modocs may secretly wish for another Captain Jack to give impetus 
to their hopes for some kind of equality. 
Captain Jack, you see, is almost a legend among the today's Modocs. 
Captain Jack and his Modocs also placed a unique chapter in the 
American history of Indian Wars--in this case, it was the Indian that 
had the fort, not the white man; in this case, the Army was not forced 
to chase the Indians; and in this case, there was nothing that warranted 
heroic legends growing up around the Modocs, as is the case with the 
Sioux, Cheyenne, Blackfeet, Comanche, Kiowa and the Nez Perce. 
The Modoc War was an unhappy, dirty little affair, not at all in 
the tradition of Indian Wars. 
Yet, the Modocs actually do deserve a legend; a legend based on 
the fact that they whipped and bulldozed the United States Army for 
four consecutive months, at consistent odds of 20 to 1. 
Can even the Apache claim that distinction? 
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